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THE PROSECUTOR'S DUTY OF DISCLOSE:
FROM BRADY TO AGURS AND BEYOND
What information must the prosecution disclose
to the defense to satisfy the demands of due proc-
ess? This question arises and must be answered in
every criminal case. The constitutional duty to
disclose emanates from the due process clause of
the Constitution which provides that "Inmo person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law."' This constitutional duty
has undergone substantial evolution over the last
half-century and what began as a narrow, strictly
defined restriction on prosecutorial misconduct has
developed into a broad, affirmative duty to turn
over materially favorable evidence to the defense.
This comment will trace the history of the prose-
cutor's duty front its inception to its present form.
Further, an analytic framework will be constructed
for use by the prosecutors and courts in determin-
ing the scope and limitations of the prosecutor's
duty. Finally, some recurring problems will be
discussed and possible solutions examined in the
light of recent Supreme Court decisions.
FROM ORI(;IN.Si "o A(;ws
The origin of this duty can be traced to the
United States Supreme Court's 1935 decision in
Mooney v. Holohan.2 In Mooney, the Court first estab-
lished the general proposition that the prosecutor's
knowing and intentional use of perjured testimony
in obtaining a conviction violates the defendant's
due process rights and denies him a fair trial3 This
ruling was reaffirmed in Pyle v. Kansas,4 where the
Court held that "allegations that his Ithe defend-
ant'sI imprisonment resulted from perjured testi-
mony, knowingly used by the state authorities to
obtain his conviction's... sufficiently charge a
deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution."f'
U.S. CONs'. anmend. V. See U.S. CONS'. amend
XIV, which guarantees due process in state proceedings.
2 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
" 294 U.S. at 112. The Court stated that the "deliberate
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testi-
niony known to be perjured ... is ... inconsistent with
the rudimentary demands ofjustice." Id.
4 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
'ld. at 216. In neither Mooney nor I:yl.e did the Court
consider the particular facts in issue. Consequently, it
failed to consider whether the perjured testimony mate-
rially aflfected the conviction.
The Mooney standard was first broadened by the
Court in Alcorla v. Texas.' In Alcorta, the defendant
was charged with the murder of his wife.' At trial,
he sought only a reduction in the crime fi'oni
murder to manslaughter, claiming that lie killed
his wife in the heat of passion caused by his wife's
infidelity.! At trial, the alleged lover testified that
he and the defendant's wife were just casual
friends! However, the alleged lover had told the
prosecution before trial that he had had sexual
relations with the defendant's wife on several oc-
casions and the prosecutor failed to correct the trial
testimony which he knew was false."' The Cont
granted a new trial and expanded the AloOney Stail-
dard by holding that the inrosectitors knowing
failure to correct inculpatory, peijured testimony
also violated due process. '
In Napue v. Illinojs,12 the Court expanded the
Mooney standard to its ftillest extent. In Napue, the
principal state witness testified that he had received
no itroiniss of consideration from the prosecution
in return for his testimony. :' I lowever, the prose-
cutor had in fact promised him consideration but
did nothing to correct the false testimony.ii The
Court granted a new trial, holding that the prose-
cutor's knowing failure to correct perjiured testi-
mony, relating solely to the credibility of the wit-
ness, constituted a violation of due process.', he
court said:
The principle that a State may not knowingly us(-
ralse evidence, including false lesti v.ony, to oblain
6:05 U.S. 28 (1957).
Id. at 28.
8 Id. at 28 29.
: Id. at 29.
") Id. at 30- 3 .
"' Id. at 31 -32. In Alcorla, the prosecutor did not have
firsthand knowledge that the alleged lover was coimliit-
ting perjury when lie testified because lie did not witlies
any relationship between the witness and the defendant's
wife. Whether such personal knowledge is necessary to
support a finding of knowing tise (if peijury will be
discussed at nottes 126- 3.4 infra and accomipanying text.
This issue did not arise in Alcorla, however, because the
prosecut(r adnitted that lie knew fhe witn.-s' testinmony
was False.
1 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
IS Id. at 265, 270 71.
"' Id. at 265, 267-68.
IS"Id. at 269.
VI. 69. No. 2
I',ihd m I US. I.
a tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of
ordered liberty, does not cease to apply merely
because the false testimony goes only to the credi-
bility of the witness. The jury's estimate of the
truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may
well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it
is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of
the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's
life or liberty may depend.
16
Thus, the Mooney standard, as extended, pro-
hibited the prosecutor from knowingly and inten-
tionally using or failing to correct any false testi-
mony. These decisions were based primarily on the
Court's rejection of prosecutorial misconduct that
would mislead the jury as to- the true facts. 17 Al-
though the defendants in these cases had also
alleged that the prosecutor suppressed favorable
evidence,' 8 such allegations had not been the basis
of the Court's finding of a due process violation.'
9
Brady v. Maryland2  marked a distinct shift in the
Court's emphasis and analysis and a corresponding
major alteration in the Mooney standard. Instead of
focusing on the prosecutor's misconduct as the basis
for a finding of violation of due process, the Court




In Brady, the defendant, charged with murder,
admitted his participation in the crime but claimed
that his companion, Boblit, who was tried sepa-
rately, had done the actual shooting.Y2 Defense
counsel in summation confessed the defendant's
participation and sought only a verdict without
capital punishment. "- Nevertheless, the jury ren-
• 2'4
dered a verdict of guilty with capital punishment.
Prior to trial, defense counsel had requested to
inspect all of Boblit's extrajudicial statements. The
prosecutor showed him several, but one %v hich was
not revealed contained Boblit's admission that he
had done the actual shooting.25 When defense
16 Id.
'7 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 n.10 (1976).
See Comment, Materiality and Defense Requests: Aids in
Defining the Prosecutor's Duty of Disclosure, 59 IOWA L. REv.
433. 435 (1975): Note, Pretrial Identification Procedures: The
Expanded Duty to Disclose Favorable Evidence, 50 NorRE
DAME LAW. 508, 510 (1975); Note, The Prosecutor's Con-
stitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Dejendant, 74 YALE
L.J. 136. 138-39 (1964).
'8 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. at 110: Pyle v. Kansas,
317 U.S. at 216.
'9 See authorities cited in note 17 supra.
2o 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
21 See authorities cited in note 17 supra.
2 373 U.S. at 84.
2 id.
V Id.
2 Id. The prosecutor had not disclosed this particular
counsel learned after the trial of this statement, hc
moved for a new trial, alleging suppression of
evidence. 26 Focusing on the defendant's right to a
fair trial,27 the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed a Maryland Court of Appeals reversal of
the convictiona and held that "the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evi-
dence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." 2 In other words, the prosecutor must
disclose to the defense favorable evidence which
has been requested and is material either to guilt
or punishment.as
The expansion and alteration of the Mooney stan-
dard by Brady placed new, significant disclosure
requirements on the prosecutor, but it did so with
few specific guidelines.3 ' Two major questions re-
mained. First, was a request for specific evidence a
prerequisite to trigger the duty to disclose?a2 Sec-
statement because it was unsigned and inadmissible at
trial, so that he felt Brady would not have been preju-
diced by its suppression. Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422,
427, 174 A.2d 167, 169-70 (1961). The statement was
allegedly inadmissible because of a Maryland rule of law
which prohibited the introduction ofextrajudicial confes-
sions or admissions of a third party that such party had
committed the offense.
26 373 U.S. at 84-85.
27 The Court stated: "The principle of Mooney v. Holo-
han is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prose-
cutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused." Id.
at 87.
2 Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961).
Since the fact that Boblit had done the shooting in no
way mitigated Brady's guilt, the court felt it sufficient to
remand solely to reconsider punishment. The court stated
that "[tihe appellant's sole claim of prejudice goes to the
punishment imposed. If Boblit's withheld confession had
been before the jury, nothing in it could have reduced
the appellant Brady's offense below murder in the first
degree. We, therefore, see no occasion to retry that issue."
Id. at 428, 174 A.2d at 171. The United States Supreme
Court concurred in this reasoning stating that further
relief could only be based on a "sporting theory of
justice." 373 U.S. at 90.
29 373 U.S. at 87.
-o The Brady holding was foreshadowed by U.S. ex rel.
Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 875 (1955), and U.S. ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195
F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953).
3' For a general discussion of Brady, see Comment,
Brady v. Mayland and the Prosecution's Duo, to Disclose, 40 U.
Cii. L. REv. 112 (1972): Note, The Prosecutor's Constitu-
tional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendants, 74 YALE L.J.
136 (1964).
32 Numerous courts and commentators following Brady
were extremely critical of any specific request require-
ment. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 102 (1967)
(Fortas, J., concurring); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786
(1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting), U.S. v. Keough, 391
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ond, what evidence is significant enough to be
considered "materially" favorable?' Other ques-
tions relate to the timing of disclosure, whether
there is a duty with respect to inadmissible evidence
and whether there is an implied duty to preserve
evidence.
For over a decade after Brady, the Supreme Court
failed to resolve the major ambiguities of the Brady
decision. The next case to reach the Court involv-
ing the Brady rule was Giles v. Maryland.:" In Giles,
a rape prosecution, the prosecutor failed to reveal
to defense counsel evidence which would impeach
the prosecutrix's credibility and would tend to
support the defendant's theory of the case.:a Al-
though the unanswered questions of Bra4y were
present in the case, the Court avoided them and
vacated the conviction on the basis of new evi-
dence which had not been considered by the lower
courts.3' Only Justice Fortas, in a concurring opin-
ion, considered the Brady issues. He interpreted the
Brady rule expansively in favor of disclosure. 7 Ac-
cording to Justice Fortas, the request requirement
should be abolished,as the inadmissibility of the
evidence should be irrelevant,39 and the concept of
materiality should be "generously conceived" to
avoid "state suppression of information which may
be useful to the defense." 40
F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968); Comment, 40 U. Cut. L. R.v
112, 115-17 (1972). See also note 83 infra.
"' See generally Comment, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose
Reconsidered, 1976 WAsm. U.L.Q. 480, 483; Note, People n
Rutherford: The Prosecution's Duty to Disclose, 6 GOLtEN
G'ri-F U.L. R-v. 851, 859 (1976); Comment, Materiality
and Defense Requests: Aids in Defining The Prosecutor's Duty to
Disclose, 59 lowA L. Ri:v. 433, 436-37 (1973).
'4 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
' Id. at 71-72. The prosecutor failed to disclose: (I)
that in a juvenile court proceeding, prior to the alleged
rape, a caseworker recommended that the prosecutrix be
placed on probation because she was beyond parental
control; (2) an occurrence five weeks after the alleged
rape, in which the prosecutrix had sexual relations with
two men, later took an overdose of sleeping pills and was
hospitalized in a psychiatric ward (she also had told a
friend that the men had raped her); and (3) a hearing in
a juvenile court in which the prosecutrix was committed
to a girl's school. The defendants claimed that the pros-
ecutrix willingly submitted to sexual relations with them.
Id. at 69-71.
3G The new evidence consisted of police reports which
tended to indicate perjury. Id. at 74-80.
'7386 U.S. at 98-102.
3Id. at 1)2.
:old. at 98. Tile state may not be "excused front its
duty to disclose material facts known to it prior to trial
solely because of a conclusion that they would not be
adnissible at trial." Id.
4 Id. at 98-99.
The next two Supreme Court cases where the
Brady issue was raised, Giglio v. United States4t and
Moore v. Illinois,42 were decided in 1972. In Giglio,
one of the government's principal witnesses testi-
fied that he received no promises of consideration
although in actuality he had been assured that he
would not be prosecuted if he testified.43 However,
the promise was made by the prosecutor who pre-
sented the case to the grand jury-the trial prose-
cutor had no knowledge of it.' Thus, unlike Napue,
where the trial prosecutor knew of the promise and
failed to reveal it, the trial prosecutor in Giglio
acted in good faith without knowledge of the per-
jury. Nevertheless, the Court made no distinction
between the two cases, holding that the failure of
the one prosecutor to inform the other is not con-
trolling and that a "promise made by one attorney
must be attributed ... to the Government."
45
The sole issue remaining, therefore, was whether
the failure to disclose the promise violated due
process, and the Court held that it did "if'the false
testimony could ... in any reasonable likelihood
have affected the judgment of the jury."4 Since
this witness was crucial to the Government's case,
the Court held that the undisclosed pronise was
sufficiently material to warrant a new trial.4 7
Since Giglio involved no bad faith, it more clearly
establishes the Brady analysis based on fair trial
considerations as opposed to prosecutorial miscon-
duct and erects a standard of materiality to be
applied when faced with the nondisclosure of per-
jured testimony. The undisclosed evidence is ma-
terial if it "in any reasonable likelihood" could
have affected the judgment of the jury.4 However,
the Court did not state that this standard should
be applied in all Brady-type cases, including those
where the nondisclosed evidence does not indicate
perjury but is in some other way favorable to the
defense. The nondisclosed evidence in Moore did
not indicate perjury on the part of any witness, but
instead allegedly tended to impeach one witness'
identification of the defendant."
41 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
42 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
4405 U.S. at 151-52.
44Id. at 152-53.
45Id. at 154.46 Id. (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. at 271).47 Id. a, 154-55.
48 Id. at 154.
" One of the Government's witnesses. Sanders, iden-
tified the defendant at trial as a man he had seen in a
bar two days after the killing. The man had boasted that
he had shot a bartender. 4)8 U.S. at 789. The prosecutor
failed to disclose to the defense, after an arguably specific
reqtest, a pre-trial statement made by Sanders. The
Interpreting Brady, the Court said:
The heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution's
suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense
production request, when the evidence is favorable
to the accused and is material either to guilt or to
punishment. Important, then, are (a) suppression
by the prosecution after a request by the defense,
(b) the evidence's favorable character for the de-
fense, and (c) the materiality of the evidence.s'
Additionally, the Court indicated that there is "no
constitutional requirement that the prosecution
make a complete and detailed accounting to the
defense of all police investigatory work on a case."
5
'
However, although the Court enumerated some
factors to consider, it failed to complete its analysis
and establish a general standard of materiality by
which the prosecutor can gauge his conduct in
determining what evidence to reveal. Nevertheless,
in view of the strong evidence of guilt presented52
and the speculative value of the undisclosed evi-
dence to the defense, "s the Court held that the
evidence was not sufficiently material to require
disclosure.5
statement identified the man in the bar as "Slick," a
person other than the defendant, whom Sanders had met
six months earlier while the defendant was in prison. Id.
at 791.
' Id. at 794-95.
5' Id. at 795.
52 Two other witnesses corroborated Sander's testi-
mony that the defendant was present at the bar and two
eyewitnesses testified that the defendant was the killer.
Id. at 795-97.
53 Since Sanders positively identified Moore at trial,
the Court stated that the mistake of Sanders was as to
the identification of Moore as "Slick" and not as to the
presence of Moore at the bar. Id. at 795-96. However,
following the United States Supreme Court decision
Moore filed a second post-conviction petition in state
court in which he contended that the Supreme Court was
incorrect when it concluded that although Sanders was
possibly wrong about identifying Moore as "Slick," he
was not wrong in his identification of Moore as the person
he heard brag about shooting a bartender. The Supreme
Court of Illinois ordered another evidentiary hearing at
which Sanders testified that if Moore was not the person
he had known as Slick, then Moore was not the person
who bragged about the shooting. The trial court denied
relief and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial.
60 Ill. 2d 379, 327 N.E.2d 344 (1975). The United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari, 423 U.S. 938 (1975),
but Mr. Justice Stewart noted that the case was in a
different factual posture, so that the prior United States
Supreme Court decision would not necessarily bar federal
habeas corpus relief. Moore subsequently filed a habeas
petition which lost in the district court and is presently
on appeal before the Seventh Circuit.
' 408 U.S. at 797.
In United States v. Agurs,55 the Supreme Court
finally addressed and resolved the two main ques-
tions left unresolved by Brady.s In Agurs, the de-
fendant was convicted of second-degree murder for
the stabbing death of one James Sewell.57 Although
the defense presented no evidence, defense counsel
sought to establish in summation that Agurs had
stabbed Sewell in self-defense.-s The support for
this theory was based primarily on the fact that
Sewell carried two knives, one of which was a
bowie knife, and that, therefore, he was a violent
person.
59
Several months after the conviction, defense
counsel moved for a new trial on the grounds that
the prosecution failed to disclose Sewell's past crim-
inal record.60 Sewell's prior record, which included
two convictions, one for assault and carrying a
deadly weapon and another for carrying a deadly
weapon,6' defense counsel argued, tended to prove
Sewell's violent nature and support the defendant's
theory of the case.? Defense counsel had not made
a specific pretrial request for this evidence.6
The district court denied this motion, holding
that the undisclosed evidence was not sufficiently
material to warrant a new trial.6 The court of
appeals reversed and held the evidence was mate-
rial "because the jury might have returned a dif-
ferent verdict if the evidence had been received. ' 65
55427 U.S. 97 (1976).
56 See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text. For a
general discussion of the holding and effect of the Agurs
decision, see Recent Development, The Prosecutor's Consti-
tutional Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence in The Absence
of a Focused Request from the Defense-United States v. Agurs,
14 AM. CRWM. L. REv. 319 (1976); 65 GEo. L.J. 201, 320
(1976); Note, People v. Rutherford: The Prosecution's Duty to
Disclose, 6 GOLDFN GATiE U.L. REv. 851 (1976); Note,
Discovery-Prosecutor's Failure to Disclose, 67 J. CRiM. L. &
C. 408 (1977); Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose After
United States v. Agurs, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 690; Comment,
Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Reconsidered, 1976 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 480.




61 Id. at 100-01. Both weapons were knives. Id. at 101.
6 Id. at 100. The trial court assumed that evidence of
the convictions would have been admissible. Id.
6 Id. at 99.
64 Id. at 101. However, the district court rejected the
Government's argument that there was no duty to dis-
close material evidence unless requested to do so. Id.
65 Id. at 102. See United States v. Agurs, 510 F.2d 1249
(D.C. Cir. 1975). The standard of materiality used by the
District of Columbia Circuit was "whether the undis-
closed evidence, if brought to the attention of the jury,
'might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt
COMMENTS [Vol. 69
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The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the
court of appeals applied an incorrect standard of
review in determining the materiality of the undis-
closed evidence.66 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court unravelled the web of issues left by Brady.
The Brady rule, the Court said, "arguably applies
in three quite different situations. Each involves
the discovery after trial, of information which had
been known to the prosecution but unknown to the
defense."
67
The first situation, as typified by Mooney v. Ho-
lohan,6s involves the discovery of evidence which
proves that the prosecution's case included per-
jured testimony and that the prosecution knew or
should have known of the perjury.69 For this type
of case, the Court established a low or strict stan-
dard of materiality,"0 indicating a strong disap-
proval of the use of perjured testimony by the
prosecution. 71 The Court stated that in the Mooney-
type case a new trial should be ordered "if there is
any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony
could have affected the judgment of the jury., 72
about appellant's guilt."' Id. at 1253 (quoting Levin v.
Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (empha-
sis added).
6 427 U.S. at 102.
67 Id. at 103. If the defense knew of the undisclosed
evidence at trial, his Brady claim must fail. See United
States v. Craig, No. 76-2089 (7th Cir. Dec. 12, 1977);
Stubbs v. Smith, 533 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1976); United
States v. Riley, 530 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1976); Maglaya v.
Buchkow, 515 F.2d 265 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
931 (1975); United States v. Callahan, No. 4-77-84 (D.
Minn. Jan. 10, 1978); Pobliner v. Fogg, 438 F. Supp. 890
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Smith v. State, 541 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1976).
6'294 U.S. 103 (1935).
69 Id. at 103. The Mooney-type case involves all those in
which the prosecution deliberately used perjured testi-
mony or knowingly failed to correct perjured testimony.
See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Miller
v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.
264 (1959); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
70 The characterization of this standard as low or strict
means that it will be relatively easy for the defense to
meet this standard and that, conversely, there will be an
extremely heavy burden on the prosecutor to disclose this
type of evidence.
7, The Court believed a strict standard was appropri-
ate in these cases primarily because "they involve a
corruption ofthe truth-seeking function of the trial proc-
ess." 427 U.S. at 104.
7 Id. at 103. This standard is in accord with the
standard established by the Court in the Mooney-type case
of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), and
is very similar to the standard used by the court of
appeals in analyzing the Agurs circumstances. United
States v. Agurs, 510 F.2d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The other two situations identified by the Court
involve the more common type of case in which
the prosecution possesses evidence which is in some
form favorable to the defense. These two situations,
although they involve the same types of evidence
are to be differentiated, the Court said, by the
presence or absence of a pretriil request for the
specific evidence in question.
Thus, the second category of cases identified by
Agurs includes those in which the defense, as in
Brady, has made a pretrial request for specific evi-
dence.73 A specific request, the Court stated, puts
the prosecutor on notice of information considered
important by the defense, and, therefore, the pros-
ecutor is under a higher duty with respect to
evidence requested than if no request or just a
general request was made. 74 The Court reasoned
that:
Although there is, of course, no duty to provide
defense counsel with unlimited discovery of every-
thing known by the prosecutor, if the subject matter
of such a request is material, or indeed if a substan-
tial basis for claiming materiality exists, it is reason-
able to require the prosecutor to respond either by
furnishing the information or by submitting the
problem to the trial judge. When the prosecutor
receives a specific and relevant request, the failure
to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.
75
Based on this reasoning, it appears that the Court
intended to establish a low standard of materiality
for this second class of cases. However, the Court
did not explicitly state what standard of materiality
would be applied in the specific request, Brady-type
case.7 The Court did state earlier in its opinion
that a "fair analysis of the holding in Brady indi-
cates that implicit in the requirement of materiality
is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have
affected the outcome of the triaL" Consequently, sev-
eral commentators have stated that "may have
affected the trial outcome" is the standard t9 apply
in specific request cases.
78
73 427 U.S. at 104.
74 Id. at 106. Other lower courts before Agurs recognized
a difference in the standard of materiality used depending
on whether or not a specific request was made. See United
States v. Keough, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968).
75 427 U.S. at 106.
76 Ste Comment, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Reconsidered,
1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 480, 489.
7427 U.S. at 104.
78 Recent Development, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence in the Absence of a Focused Request from
the Defense-United States v. Agurs, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
319, 326 (1976); Note, People v. Rutherford: The Prosecution's
Duty to Disclose, 6 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 851, 880
19781
This is most likely the correct conclusion. The
Court stated that when faced with a specific re-
quest, the failure of the prosecutor to respond is
seldom excusable. 79 This language clearly implies
that a strict standard of materiality will be em-
ployed where the prosecutor makes no response.80
However, if the prosecutor does respond by disclo-
sure to the trial judge, what standard should he
employ? Agurs does not say.
8
'
The third situation identified by the Court is
typified by the facts of Agurs wherein the prosecutor
failed to disclose allegedly favorable evidence8 that
the defense had not specifically requested.83 In
these circumstances where the prosecutor has not
received notice of what the defense would like, the
Court held that the duty to disclose still arises, but
only if "the evidence is so clearly supportive of a
claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution
notice of a duty to produce."
84
In these cases, the Court held, the standard of
materiality applied will be high, for the prosecutor
"will not have violated his constitutional duty to
disclose unless his omission is of sufficient signifi-
cance to result in a denial of the defendant's right
to a fair trial.' ' ss To determine what standard of
materiality would be proper, the Court reviewed
other standards previously used by the lower
(1976): Note, Discovery-Prosecutor's Failure to Disclose, 67
J. CRIM. L. & C. 408-10 (1977).
9 427 U.S. at 106.
80 See Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose after United
States v. Agurs, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 690, 696. "The standard
of materiality is apparently a lenient test for the defend-
ant. The prosecutor's failure to respond raises a presump-
tion that the evidence requested was material."
81 See text accompanying notes 145-48 infra for further
discussion of this issue.
82 The non-disclosed evidence did not prove perjury on
the part of any witness. 427 U.S. at 114.
83 Prior to Agurs, the Court had not decided whether
the prosecutor was constitutionally bound to disclose any
favorable evidence absent a specific request. Id. at 106.
However, after Brady, numerous courts and commenta-
tors advocated the abolishment of the specific request
requirement. See United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455
(9th Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288
(5th Cir. 1968); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287 (D.C.
Cir. 1966): Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir.
1964): Castleberry v. Crisp, 414 F. Supp. 950 (N.D. Okla.
1976); Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty
to Disclose, 40 U. CH. L. REv. 112 (1972). Moreover, the
Agurs trial court rejected the Government's claim that it
need not disclose absent a specific request and said, "How
can you request that which you don't know exists." 427
U.S. at 101 n.4.
"4 427 U.S. at 107.
mId. at 108.
courts.so The Court specifically rejected the District
of Columbia Circuit's standard which would allow
for a new trial, if the nondisclosed evidence "might
affect the jury's verdict. ' 8 7 This standard, the
Court held, was too low, for it approached the
"sporting theory of justice" expressly rejected by
Brady.s The Court noted that the Constitution
does not demand that the prosecution "allow com-
plete discovery of his files."so
On the other hand, the Court rejected as too
burdensome the standard of Federal Rule of Crim-
inal Procedure 33, which has been interpreted to
entitle a defendant to a new trial if the "newly
discovered evidence probably would have resulted
in an acquittal."9 The Court distinguished be-
tween the normal Rule 33 case where new evidence
is discovered from a neutral source and the Agurs
case where the new evidence was in the hands of
the prosecutor and held that:
If the standard applied to the usual motion for a
new trial based on newly discovered evidence were
the same when the evidence was in the State's
possession as when it was found in a neutral source,
there would be no special significance to the prose-
cutor's obligation to serve the cause ofjustce.m
However, the Court noted, although this extremely
high standard should not be used, the mere fact
that the nondisclosure cannot be characterized as
"harmless error" does not necessarily mandate re-
versal. 93
"The proper standard of materiality," the Court
reasoned, "must reflect our overriding concern with
the justice of the finding of guilt." 4 The finding of
guilt will be "permissible only if supported by
evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."9 " Therefore, the Court concluded:
8Id. at 108-13.
7 Id. at 108.
8Id.
9 Id. at 109. In Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795
(1972), the Court stated that there is "no constitutional
requirement that the prosecution make a complete and
detailed accounting to the defense of all police investi-
gatory work."
90 FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 provides that: "The court on
motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to him if
required in the interest ofjustice."
427 U.S. at 111. For cases applying this standard in
a Rule 33 case, see United States v. Slutsky, 514 F.2d
1222 (2d Cir. 1975), and the cases cited in Agurs, 427 U.S.
at 111 n.19.
92427 U.S. at 111.
9




THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE
If the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt
that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has
been committed. This means that the omission must
be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If
there is no reasonable doubt whether or not the
additional evidence is considered, there is no justi-
fication for a new trial.6
Applying this high standard 7 to the undisclosed
evidence presented in Agurs and evaluating its im-
portance in the context of the entire record, the
Court concluded that the evidence was not mate-
rial because it did not contradict any of the State's
evidence and was only cumulative of other evi-
dence of Sewell's allegedly violent nature.9
s
This reasoning and ahalysis is consonant with
the Burger Court's focus on the primary substan-
tive issue of innocence or guilt as opposed to the
Warren Court's preoccupation with procedural
technicalities which often lead to the suppression
of valuable, reliable evidence.9 In Stone v. PowelI,'°°
decided soon after Agurs, the Burger Court noted
that undue emphasis on the procedural aspects of
the trial intrudes on important values such as (1)
the effective utilization of limited judicial re-
sources, (2) the necessity of finality in criminal
trials, and (3) the deterrent function of the law.10'
In Agurs, the Court recognized these important
interests and attempted to redress the balance be-
tween society's right and the defendant's technical,
procedural rights in favor of the common good.
Although Agurs expands the defendant's right to
receive information in that it imposes upon the
prosecutor a duty to disclose absent a specific
request, the Agurs Court defined this duty in very
narrow terms by applying a high standard in eval-
uating undisclosed evidence. However, since due
process requires only that the defendant's guilt be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt °2 and since the
SId at 112-13.
97 In his dissent, Justice Marshall stated that this stan-
dard was too high and, in effect, was equivalent to the
Rule 33 standard. Id at 115-16. He stated that "[tihe
burden thus imposed on the defendant [by the majority's
standard] is at least as 'severe' as, if not more 'severe'
than, the burden he generally faces on a Rule 33 motion.
Id. Other commentators have concurred with this state-
ment. See Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose after United
States v. Agurs, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 690, 698-99.
98 427 U.S. at 114.
99 See Comment, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Reconsidered,
1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 480, 481-82. See generally Shapiro,
Searches, Seizures and Lineups: Evolving Constitutional Standards
Under the Warren and Burger Courts, 20 N.Y.L.F. 217 (1974).
'0a 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
o' Id. at 491.
102 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Agurs standard provides for a new trial if the un-
disclosed evidence creates a reasonable doubt as to
guilt, the Agurs standard adequately protects the
accused's due process rights. 0 3
BEYOND AGURS
The importance of the Agurs opinion should not
be underestimated, for it establishes a new frame-
work with which to analyze the prosecutor's duty
to disclose evidence. The Court identified the three
different situations where the Brady rule arguably
applies and created a standard of materiality to be
used in determining whether the failure to disclose
evidence warranted a new trial.
In the first situation, where the prosecutor know-
ingly uses or allows perjury to stand uncorrected,
a new trial should be granted "if there is any
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could
have affected the judgment of the jury."°t In the
second situation, where the prosecutor receives a
10 Some commentators have attacked the Agurs rea-
sonable doubt standard as too strict, encouraging the
prosecutor to suppress, not reveal evidence. See Comment,
Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Reconsideied, 1976 WASH.
U.L.Q. 480, 492.
Such criticism, however, is unwarranted and lacks
realistic insight. In the great majority of Agurs-type cases,
the prosecutor does not know of or does not realize he
has the allegedly favorable evidence. Therefore, the stan-
dard can hardly encourage suppression.
Furthermore, some commentators have argued that
the bad faith of the prosecutor in failing to disclose
favorable evidence should be considered in determining
error. See Recent Development, 14 AM. CRIM. L. Ri-EV.
319, 331 (1976); Comment, Prosecuter's Duty to Disclose
Reconsidered, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 480, 492. However, the
Court clearly stated with good reason that the good faith
or bad faith of the prosecutor is immaterial in determin-
ing if the non-disclosure was error. The Court stated:
Nor do we believe the constitutional obligation is
measured by the moral culpability, or the willful-
ness, of the prosecutor.... [I]f evidence actually has
no probative significance at all, no purpose would
be served by requiring a new trial simply because
an inept prosecutor incorrectly believed he was
suppressing a fact that would be vital to the defense.
If the suppression of evidence results in constitu-
tional error, it is because of the character of the
evidence, not the character of the prosecutor.
427 U.S. at 110. This concentration on the character of
the evidence as opposed to the conduct of the prosecutor
is clearly the correct concern, for the suppression of an
immaterial fact does not in any way affect the correctness
of the verdict no matter what the willfulness of the
prosecutor may have been. This is consonant with the
Court's focus on the guilt or innocence of the defendant,
instead of considering irrelevant collateral issues.
"m 427 U.S. at 103.
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specific request for evidence and fails to respond,
a new trial should be granted if the undisclosed
evidence "might have affected the outcome of the
trial."' " Finally, in the third situation, where the
defense made no request or just a general request
and the prosecutor fails to disclose allegedly favor-
able evidence, a new trial need only be granted "if
,the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt
that did not otherwise exist. ' on
Although the framework is straightforward, its
application is difficult in some cases because the
three situations are not always clearly distinguish-
able, and questions have arisen as to when each
standard governs. For example, a prosecutor may
know that a Government witness previously gave
a story contrary to his trial testimony. Does this
constitute the knowing use of perjury so that the
low standard of materiality will be applied, or is
the prior inconsistent statement merely a favorable
piece of evidence the materiality of which is gov-
erned by the high Agurs standard? Similarly, how
exact and precise need a request for evidence be in
order to constitute a specific request for evidence
and application of the lower Brady standard?
After it has been determined what standard is to
be applied, another major issue left unresolved by
Agurs is what factors to consider in determining
whether a piece of evidence is material. Addition-
ally, the problems of timing, admissibility and
preservation were not discussed in the Agurs opin-
ion. The remainder of this comment, therefore, will
attempt to fill the gaps left by the Agurs decision in
order to establish general guidelines for the prose-
cutor and the courts in deciding what evidence
must. be disclosed to satisfy the demands of due
process.107
WHICH S'IANIARI GOVERNS WHEN?
One of the most crucial determinations which
must be made in determining what evidence must
be disclosed is the standard of materiality govern-
ing the particular case because disclosure will often
depend on the standard used. Some commentators
have mistakenly suggested that the Agurs frame-
work is really only of practical use to the courts
and not prosecutors.'( A determination by the
prosecutor as to what standard applies to a partic-
'05 Id. at 104.
'
06 Id. at 112.
107 Primary emphasis will be placed on the third situ-
ation enumerated in Agurs because it is the most contro-
versial.
i08 See Note, Discovery-Prosecutor's Failure to Disclose, 67
j. CRIM. L. & C. 408, 415 (1977).
ular piece of evidence will greatly assist him in
deciding whether to disclose it." 9
What, therefore, are the parameters of the three
different situations identified in Agurs? The first
situation described in Agurs to which a low stan-
dard applies occurs where "the prosecution's case
includes perjured testimony and that the prosecu-
tion knew, or should have known, of the
perjury. °110
To prove that this situation exists, the defendant
must show first that the witness has committed
perjury and second that the prosecutor knew or
should have known of the perjury. It is clear that
such a situation exists where (I) the prosecutor has
instructed the witness to tell a falsehood,"' (2) the
witness tells the prosecutor one story before trial
which the prosecutor personally knows is true and
then testifies differently at trial," '2 or (3) the pros-
ecutor has made a promise or threat to the witness
and the witness denies such while testifying.'" In
each of these circumstances, the prosecutor had
personal knowledge of the perjury without refer-
ence to any outside source.
Some commentators have suggested that the
Court's "should have known" language implies
that this situation involving possible perjury also
exists where the prosecutor receives evidence ex-
culpating the defendant and casting doubt on the
credibility of a witness, thereby indicating the pos-
sibility of perjury.' 1 4 In other words, this situation
involves circumstances where the prosecutor pos-
sessed evidence impeaching a witness which, there-
fore, arguably tends to show the witness may be
lying."!" As a general rule, the lower courts have
rejected claims of this type where the undisclosed
evidence does not show beyond a reasonable doubt
that a witness committed perjury.
In Wilson v. State," 6 the defendant claimed that
the prosecutor's nondisclosure of an exculpatory
statement, which differed significantly from the
testimony of a State's witness, constituted a know-
ing failure by the prosecutor to correct perjured
iUgThe prosecutor who knows that the evidence is
governed by a low standard of materiality will be ex-
tremely reticent to not disclose it, for fear of reversal later
on grounds of suppression.
10 427 U.S. at 103.
"' See Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942): Mooney v.
Ilolohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
1 2 See Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
113 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
114 See Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose After United
States v. Agurs, 1977 U. hi.. L.F. 690, 696.
"s Id.
116372 A.2d 198 (Del. 1977).
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testimony."17 Relying on Agurs, the court rejected
the defendant's assertions of prosecutorial miscon-
duct, implying that the mere fact that the prose-
cutor possesses an exculpatory statement contra-
dicting a witness does not establish the knowing
use of perjury." 8
Similarly, in United States v. Hearst,"9 the Govern-
ment used a witness who had previously made
statements inconsistent to the testimony he gave at
trial.' 2° Consequently, the defendant argued that
"the government had reason to suspect that Shep-
ard's [the witness'] trial testimony was 'false."'
'
However, the court rejected this argument and
held that "a prosecutor's use of a.witness who has
made prior inconsistent statements cannot and
does not, in and of itself, constitute 'knowing use of
false evidence. ' ' 122 Also, in McDonald v. State,123 a
Government witness, who failed to identify the
defendant from a photographic spread held long
before trial, testified at trial that he did not remem-
ber being shown any photographs. 124 In response
to the defendant's claim that the prosecutor failed
to correct perjured testimony, the court responded
that the testimony that the witness could not re-
member does not amount to perjury."
Thus, the "should have known" language of the
Agurs opinion probably was not intended to impose
a new requirement that the prosecutor avoid neg-
ligence in believing that his witness is truthful. The
first situation identified by Agurs does not exist
unless the prosecutor's conduct is intentional.
Therefore, the mere fact that the prosecutor pos-
sesses evidence which only impeaches a Govern-
ment witness is insufficient to constitute the know-
ing use of perjury. However, the line between
impeaching evidence and evidence which proves
perjury may be quite thin.
Generally, knowing use of perjury cases involve
first-hand knowledge of the perjury by the prose-
cutor. 12 6 However, it is conceivable that the prose-
cutor could receive information from a third party
1-7 Id. at 200.
"bId.
"9 424 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Cal. 1976), af/'d, 563 F.2d
1331 (9th Cir. 1977).
'2 Id at 318.
121 Id.
12 2 Id.
'a553 P.2d 171 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976).
'U Id. at 176-77.
125 Id. at 177. See also United States v. Hedgeman, 564
F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1977) (where the undisclosed evidence
is not clearly contradictory to the witness' testimony, the
defendant has not established a perjury situation).
126 See notes 110-12 supra and accompanying text.
or parties which clearly proves that the witness is
committing perjury. Even though the prosecutor
would not have first-hand personal knowledge of
these facts, if they establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that the witness is lying, the prosecutor's use
of that witness should constitute knowing use of
perjury. This result can and should be reached
without resort to the "should have known" lan-
guage of the Agurs Court.
The Court's use of "should have known" when
describing the perjury situation was most likely an
allusion of the circumstances involved in the Giglio
case.srr In Giglio, the trial prosecutor did not per-
sonally know that the Government's witness was
lying when he said he received no promises of
leniency, but the prosecutor who had presented the
case to the grand jury had made a promise to the
witness and, therefore, knew of facts indicating
perjury.' 28 Although the trial prosecutor did not
know of the evidence indicating perjury, the Court
held that he "should have known" of it because
another member of the prosecution team possessed
the evidence. 2 9 Generally, a prosecutor "should
know" of a piece of evidence if it is in his possession
or in the possession of any agency involved in the
prosecution."'- This includes other prosecutors in
the office, 13' police' 2 and any other investigative
agencies involved in criminal prosecution.'3a How-
ever, "the prosecutor has no duty to disclose infor-
mation in the possession of government agencies
which are not investigative arms of the prosecution
and have not participated in the case, even if such
information might be helpful to the accused.))134
127 See notes 41-48 supra and accompanying text.
128405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972).
'2 d at 154.
'30 "The 'prosecution' involves all agencies of the fed-
eral government involved in any way in the prosecution
of criminal litigation." United States v. McCord, 509
F.2d 334, 342 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
930 (1975). For similar holdings, see United States v.
Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265, 1272 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1352 n.91 (D.C. Cir.
1974); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 650 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Emmett v. Ricketts, 397 F. Supp. 1025, 1041
(N.D. Ga. 1975). See also ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY
& PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL, § 2.1 (d) (1970).
"31 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
"2Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 331
F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964); Evans v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp.
218 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
133 United States v. Eley, 335 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ga.
1972). See also authorities cited in note 128 supra.
14 Id. at 358. See also United States v. Ehrlichman, 389
F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1974) (transcripts in possession of
Congressional subcommittee investigating Watergate
conspiracy are not in possession of Government); United
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Thus, the "should have known" language of Agurs
probably refers to circumstances where information
which would demonstrate perjury by a prosecution
witness, although not known to the prosecutor, is
imputed to his knowledge because it is possessed
by an investigative arm of the prosecution.
The failure of the Court to address circumstances
where the prosecutor obtains evidence from a third
party which proves that a government witness
committed perjury does not mean that that situa-
tion would not merit the low Mooney standard. It
could be argued that unless the prosecutor has
personal knowledge of the perjury, third-party in-
formation that the witness is lying would just be
favorable evidence governed by the high Agurs
standard. Such a result would be clearly unreason-
able. If the defendant can prove beyond a reason-
able doubt or at least by clear and convincing
proof that the witness committed perjury and that
the prosecutor was informed of the perjury (even
though he did not have personal knowledge), a
court should apply the low standard of materiality.
The second situation, identified by Agurs, is the
Brady-type where, if the prosecutor receives a spe-
cific request for evidence and fails to respond, a
low standard of materiality is used in evaluating
whether the nondisclosure constituted error.135 The
third situation, where the high standard is used, is
the Agurs-type where the defense makes no request
or just a general request for favorable evidence,
and the prosecutor does not disclose a piece of
allegedly favorable evidence.lss The sole difference
between these two situations is the specificity of the
request by defense counsel. Since a lower standard
of materiality is applied where a specific as opposed
to a general request is made, it is clearly to the
defendant's advantage to characterize all requests
as specific. However, unless a request is precise
enough to "give the prosecutor notice of exactly
what the defense" desires, the higher Agurs stan-
dard will apply.'
37
For example, a request for a particular witness'
pretrial statements or for a certain piece of tangible
physical evidence is specific. t ss However, a request
States v. Brooks, Crim. No. 26863 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 7,
1971).
'3 427 U.S. at 104.
'3Id. at 106-07.
137 Id. See also United States v. Mackey, No. 77-1074
(7th Cir. Feb. 22, 1978); United States v. McCrane, 436
F. Supp. 760 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
138 State v. Brown, 98 Idaho 209, 560 P.2d 880 (1977)
(request for witness'-pretrial statement is specific); State
v. May, 339 So. 2d 764 (La. 1976) (request for a letter is
for "a list of witnesses and copies of any written or
oral statements" made by the State's witnesses is
not a specific request.'3 Additionally, a defense
request for "all Brady material" or for "anything
exculpatory" is not specific.
140
This distinction is not always clear, and some
courts have held a request to be specific which did
not direct the prosecutor's attention to a particular
piece of evidence. For example, in United States v.
McCrane,14 1 the defense requested all exculpatory
material and material which may be used to. im-
peach Government witnesses, including but not
limited to standards used in declining prosecution
of Government witnesses in similar circum-
stances.1 42 The government claimed that it had no
Brady material and maintained this position in the
face of the trial judge's admonition to submit any
questionable materials in camera.143 Under these
circumstances, the court held that the request was
specific, reasoning that it required "no profound
intellectual analysis to perceive that the defense
was seeking material that might provide a basis for
a claim of prosecutorial favoritism or preferential
treatment of government witnesses.""
This decision is difficult to reconcile with the
language in Agurs that a specific request must give
the prosecutor notice of exactly what the defense
wants. The defense request in McCrane, however,
was ambiguous and open-ended, in essence re-
questing all impeaching material. This type of
request does not direct the prosecutor to a partic-
ular piece or even type of evidence. Instead, it
would require a review of his entire file with a view
towards attacking the credibility of his own witness.
If such is the case, the request can hardly be
considered specific. Thus, the amount of precision
required to create a specific request is, presently not
clear. As a general guideline, however, if the re-
quest gives the prosecutor notice of exactly what
specific); Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 369 A.2d
1277 (1977) (Roberts, J., concurring) (request for all voict.
exemplars is specific).
"9 People v. Jones, 66 I11. 2d 158, 361 N.E.2d 1104
(1977). See Wagster v. Overberg, 560 F.2d 735 (6th Cir.
1977).
140 427 U.S. at 106-07. See also United States v. Me-
Crane, 436 F. Supp. 760 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (request for
material which could be used to impeach Government
witness is not specific and falls within the second category
of Agurs).
14 547 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1976).
142 Id. at 207.
143 Id. at 207-08.
' Id. at 207.
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the defense desires, it will be considered specific,
thus triggering the lower standard of materiality.
One other gray area which no court as yet has
considered is whether the low Brady standard of
materiality should apply in cases where there has
been a specific request and the prosecutor responds
by submitting the requested evidence to the trial
court for in camera inspection. The Agurs Court
stated that where the defense specifically requests
arguably favorable material, "it is reasonable to
require the prosecutor to respond either b " furnish-
ing the information [to the defense] or by submit-
ting the problem to the trial judge."' 145 Therefore,
the Court concluded that "the failure to make any
response is seldom, if ever, excusable.,
146
It is relatively clear that the failure to respond at
all to a specific request triggers the application of
the low Brady standard in evaluating the material-
ity of the undisclosed evidence. However, if the
prosecutor responds by submission to the trial
court, and the trial court refuses to disclose, there
is a question of what standard of materiality a
reviewing court should employ to determine error.
If the low standard of materiality applied in spe-
cific request cases is used to induce the prosecutor
to make some responses and to deter misconduct,
then it seems to follow that where the prosecutor
does respond by submission to the court, the lower
standard should no longer apply. However, if the
rationale for the lower standard is that the prose-
cutor should be placed under a heavier burden at
all times when he knows exactly what the defense
wants, then the lower standard should apply to all
evidence which is not disclosed.
It is unlikely that the Agurs Court intended that
a higher standaro be used in evaluating evidence
which has been specifically requested simply be-
cause the prosecutor turned it over to the trial
judge. The Court's reference to submitting the
evidence to the trial judge147 is, therefore, probably
unwarranted. However, this question stems from a
more basic defect in the Court's reasoning. The
Agurs Court stressed that the character of the evi-
dence and not the conduct of the prosecutor was
paramount in determining whether disclosure was
required. 's If this is true, then there would seem to
be no reason for differentiation between cases on
the basis of whether or not a specific request is
made. The presence or absence of a specific request
in no way alters the character of the evidence;
'4 427 U.S. at 106.
146 id.
147 id.
"8 Id. at 110.
therefore, the standards of materiality should be
the same for both. The reason for the difference in
standards is probably that the Court did not want
the prosecutor who knows that the defense wants
a piece of evidence to deliberately withhold it
hoping that after trial a reviewing court will hold
it immaterial. When dealing with instances of no
request or a general request, the prosecutor will not
generally know of or recognize the value of alleg-
edly favorable evidence so that the problem of
deliberate withholding does not arise. However, if
deliberate withholding is the basic reason it belies
the Court's focus on the character of the evidence
as opposed to the conduct of the prosecutor.
THE FACrIORS OF MATERIALrFY
After a determination has been made as to which
standard of materiality applies, it must then be
decided whether the evidence in question is of
sufficient importance-materiality-to warrant
disclosure. Generally, it is impossible to classify
particular kinds of evidence as requiring or not
requiring disclosure. Instead, the issue of disclosure
must be determined on a case-by-case basis consid-
ering each piece of evidence separately. Whether
or not disclosure will be required depends on a
number of diverse considerations which may be
called the "factors of materiality."
In each case, regardless of the standard of ma-
teriality, factors of materiality must be analyzed
and weighed, for by this analysis the probative
weight of materiality of the evidence can be deter-
mined. In each case the factors of materiality re-
main constant, while the standard of materiality
may change. This does not affect the analysis,
therefore, but only whether the evidence must be
disclosed. By weighing the factors of materiality
the importance of the evidence is determined, and
then the court will apply the appropriate standard
to decide whether the evidence must be disclosed.
Unfortunately, the Agurs Court failed to enu-
merate the factors of materiality which should be
considered in analyzing the evidence. However,
subsequent cases have established and applied the
various factors which must be considered. Since
most of today's controversy focuses on the Agurs
standard of materiality, the remainder of this sec-
tion is devoted the Agurs standard and the factors
considered in determining whether evidence must
be disclosed.
Favorability
It has been well established that there is no
constitutional requirement that the prosecutor
open his files to defense counsel. 49 Due process
requires only that the prosecutor disclose evidence
which is materially favorable to the defense.'
50
Favorable evidence is that evidence which tends to
exculpate the defendant or support his theory of
defense. Evidence which may be helpful to the
defendant is not necessarily favorable and if it is
not, it need not be disclosed. For example, knowl-
edge of incriminating evidence might be helpful to
the defendant in determining what defense to pres-
ent and in preparing his witnesses. However, al-
though inculpatory evidence may be helpful if
disclosed, it is not favorable and cannot be a basis
for a Brady claim.1
5 1
Therefore, unless the defendant can prove that
the evidence in some way tends to support his case,
it need not be disclosed.' 5 2
For example, in Wagster v. Overberg,153 the defend-
ant was convicted of second degree murder after a
trial wherein he sought to establish self defense.1
54
After trial the defendant claimed that the failure
of the prosecutor to disclose one witness' statement,
which contradicted the state's case as to the loca-
tion of the shooting in the bar where the incident
149 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976);
Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972); United States
v. Miller, 529 F.2d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 924 (1976); United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150,
173 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974);
Lundy v. State, 139 Ga. App. 536, 228 S.E.2d 717 (1976);
State v. Tatum, 291 N.C. 73, 229 S.E.2d 562 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Royster, 372 A.2d 1194 (Pa. 1977);
Ransonette v. State, 550 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977). For a general discussion concerning the value and
probability of an open file system in the future, see Note,
The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose After United States v. Agurs,
1977 U. ILL. L.F. 690, 715-18.
15 Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972).
1' United States v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 202 (3d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); People v. Gott, 43 Ill. App.
3d 137, 356 N.E.2d 1102 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Medina, 364 N.E.2d 203 (Mass. 1977).
152 This requirement has been especially important
where the defense has claimed that the failure of the
Government to produce their informant violates Brady. In
People v. Jenkins, 41 N.Y.2d 307, 310, 360 N.E.2d 1288,
1290, 392 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (1977), the court, relying on
Agurs, held that "in order to compel production [of the
informant],.., the defendant must ... demonstrate that
the proposed testimony of the informant would tend to
be exculpatory." For a similar result, see United States v.
DeAngelis, 490 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
956 (1974). Similarly, in United States v. VanMaanen,
547 F.2d 50, 53-54 (8th Cir. 1976), the court held that
the identity of an informant need not be disclosed unless
the defense proved he had favorable, material evidence.
'53 560 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1977).
'54 Id. at 740.
occurred, denied him due process. '- The court
rejected this claim and held that "even if the
statement of ... [the witness] were somehow ma-
terial as to the locale of the shooting, this cannot
be said to constitute evidence of self defense ....
[T]he statement of ... [the witness] did not offer
any significant support to any claim [of self-de-
fense] .... "' Thus, since the witness' statement
did not advance the defendant's theory of the case,
Brady did not require its disclosure.
Similarly, impeaching evidence need not be dis-
closed unless it actually impugns the credibility or
veracity of a witness who incriminates the defend-
ant. In Ruiz v. State,157 the defendant claimed that
the prosecutor's failure to disclose an agreement
made with a State's witness violated his ,Brady
rights.5s8 However, the undisclosed agreement was
only that the state would protect the witness from
reprisals arising due to his trial testimony. 5 9 Since
this agreement was "irrelevant to Ruiz's [the de-
fendant's] guilt or innocence" and "was not excul-
patory in any sense of the word," it need not be
disclosed.' 60 "Unless the evidence not disclosed is
probative of innocence," the court said, "no duty
to disclose arises." 16 1
Some controversy has arisen with respect to
"neutral" evidence, evidence which neither really
inculpates nor exculpates the defendant, but which
may form a basis for a favorable defense argument.
In Smith v. United States,161 a rape prosecution, the
prosecutor failed to disclose a laboratory report
which found that none of the defendant's pubic
hairs were discovered after a combing had been
taken from the victim.16n In response to the defend-
ant's assertion that the nondisclosure violated
Brady, the court held that "the absence of appel-
lant's hair at the scene is not indicative of inno-
cence," and, therefore, the nondisclosure was not
error.16
15 Id. at 735-38.
'56Id. at 740.
'57 75 Wis. 2d 230 249 N.W.2d 277 (1977).
"58 Id. at 232, 249 N.W.2d at 279.
159 Id. at 238, 249 N.W.2d at 282.
'60 Id. at 238-40, 249 N.W.2d at 282-83.
161 Id. at 241-42, 249 N.W.2d at 284. Similarly, denial
of a defense motion requesting that the court examine
the prosecutor's file is proper unless the defense can show
that the inspection would reveal evidence helpful to the
defense. Commonwealth v. Gartner, 381 A.2d 114 (Pa.
1977).
'b2 363 A.2d 667 (D.C. 1976).
'63 Id. at 668.
'c Id. at 669. For similar factual circumstances and
result, see Norris v. Slayton, 540 F.2d 1241, 1244 (4th
Cir. 1976), where the court held that "the undisclosed
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Similarly, in United States v. Hauff,165 the Govern-
ment failed to disclose a handwriting expert's re-
port that was inconclusive as to whether or not the
defendant had written the envelopes in question.'
66
Although the defendant claimed the report was
favorable, the court held that the "report was not
exculpatory, ... [but] merely not inculpatory. We
cannot agree with the District Judge's description
of it as 'favorable." ' 67 Therefore, the failure to
disclose was not error.
68
On the other hand, in Patler v. Slayton,16 9 the
Government failed to disclose until trial results of
laboratory tests which were done on clothing alleg-
edly worn by the criminal and on clothing owned
by the defendant. The tests were negative for the
prosecution in that they failed to link the defendant
with the clothing allegedly worn by the culprit."7T
Although the court recognized that the test results
were "neutral" rather than exculpatory, it said
that:
[S]uch a characterization [as neutral] often has little
meaning; evidence such as this may, because of its
neutrality, tend to be favorable to the accused.
While it does not by any means establish his absence
from the crime, it does demonstrate that a number




While the lower courts have not concurred on
how to treat "neutral" evidence, the reasoning of
the Patler court seems compelling in at least some
circumstances. A distinction might be made be-
tween test results which are negative as opposed to
those which are inconclusive. Where results are
negative in that they fail to associate the defendant
laboratory report, neutral in character as it was, would
have played a completely innocuous role in petitioner's
trial and would not have influenced the outcome of the
case."
'65 473 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907
(1973).
'66 Id. at 1353-54.
'6 Id. at 1354.
168 Id. at 1355. See also Commonwealth v. Satterfield,
364 N.E.2d 1260, 1264 (Mass. 1977), where the prosecutor
failed to disclose the names of four witnesses, two of
whom stated they saw nothing and two who could not be
found, the court held that such evidence need not be
disclosed because it was "empty rather than exculpa-
tory."
'69 503 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1974).
0 Id. at 478-79 n.5.
7 Id. at 479. See also United States ex rel. Raymond v.
Illinois, 455 F.2d 62, 66 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 885 (1972) (prosecutor required to disclose lab report
that no sperm was discovered on clothing of alleged
rapist).
with the crime, they should be considered favora-
ble. However, where the results are inconclusive
because, for example, there is insufficient material
to test, then those results are of so innocuous a
character that they need not be disclosed.
Finally, it must also be mentioned that the mere
fact that an item might be helpful to the defense
does not necessarily mean that it is favorable to the
defense and must be disclosed.' 72 For example, in
People v. Jones,'73 the defendant claimed the prose-
cutor violated Brady by failing to disclose to him
during plea bargaining that the complaining wit-
ness had died. 74 The court, however, denied the
claim reasoning that although "such information
.might have assisted the defendant to prepare for
trial ... [it] is not exculpatory evidence-evidence
material either to guilt or punishment" and, there-
fore, it need not have been'disclosed. 75 Similarly,
in United States tr. Orzechowski 76 and United States v.
UMentum, 177 the courts held that the prosecutor was
not required to disclose internal Drug Enforcement
Administration memoranda relating to cocaine
identification tests because although they would be
helpful to the defendant in cross-examining the
Government's expert, they were neither material
nor exculpatory 78 Thus, favorability is an impor-
tant threshold factor in determining materiality,
for unless a piece of evidence can be characterized
as favorable it need not be disclosed. 79
Admissibility
A second important factor to consider in deter-
mining materiality is whether the allegedly favor-
172 "The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed
information might have helped the defense ... does not
establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense." 427
U.S. at 109-10.
'73 87 Misc. 2d 931, 387 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1976).
'74 Id. at 934, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
17 5 Id. at 942, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
176 547 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
906 (1977).
"n 547 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
983 (1977).
'78 547 F.2d at 985; 547 F.2d at 989. In a similar vein
see Terrell v. United States, 361 A.2d 207 (D.C. 1976),
cert. denied, - U.S. _ (Prosecutor need not disclose notes
concerning past jury performances of prospective jurors.
Although these notes would be helpful to defense counsel,
they cannot in any way be considered favorable.).
17 For other cases in this area, see Lundy v. State, 139
Ga. App. 536, 228 S.E.2d 717 (1976) (photographs ex-
hibited to police officer to determine defendant's name
need not be disclosed); State v. Owens, 338 So. 2d 645
(La. 1976) (statement to witness who saw and heard
nothing need not be disclosed).
able evidence is adnissible at trial. Linlortunately,
a maJority of th Supreme Court has never directly
addressed this issue so that no general rule exists as
to how to treat favorable but inadnissible evi-
dence." llowever, the language of some of the
Court's decisions tends to indicate that adnissibil-
ity is a prerequisite to triggering the duty of disclo-
sure.," On the other hand, Justice Fortas, concur-
ring in Giles, specifically rejected any admissibility
requirement stating, "I do not agree that the state
may be excused from its duty to disclose mlaterial
facts ... solely because of a conclusion that they
would not be admissible at trial."l' l'The failure of
the Suprene Court to provide guidance on the
issue of admissibility has created widely divergent
views in the lower courts.
Some cotirts and conmentators, relying oil tile
Supreme Court majority opinions in which the
contested evidence was either found to be admnis-
sible or assumed to be so, have inferred therefron
a requirement that unless the evidence is adinissi-
ble, it need not be disclosed.'"" For exanple. in
Thornton ,. State,.18 the defendant sought disclosure
of the identity of a police tipster-inforrner under
Brady. Ilowever, the court rejected this claim stat-
ing that if "the informer is a pure tipster, who has
neither participated in nor witnessed the offense,
any evidence he might offer would be hearsay and
inadmissil)le. Thus, the tipster's identity could n0t
be material to the guilt or innocence of the delnd-
ant under Brady. -,K,
At the other extreme, some courts, relying on
justice Fortas' concurrence in Giles, have rejected
admissibility entirely as even a factor to consider
in determnining materiality. For example, in EtImme/l
i. Ricke/is, u4 the prosecutor refused to disclose to
"'~ In all the Supreme Court cases where the Court has
considered tile disclosure issues, the evidence in question
was either admissible or assuned so. a gnrnd.
111 S, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. art I01 02;
Giles v. Maryland, 3116 U.S. at 74; Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. at 85.
", (;tile, v. Maryland, 386 U.S. at 98 (Fortasj, .. con-
eurring).
IlSe United States ex tel Wilson v. State, 437 F.
Supp. -17 (I). )el. 1977); United State.s v. Atkinson, 425)
F. Supp. 881, 884 (,.I).N.C. 1977); In re Ferguson, 5 Cal.
:d 525, 534, 487 P.2d 1234, 12-f0, 96 Cal. Rptr. 59)4, 601)
(1)71); Recent l)evelopinent, 14 Am. CRit. L. Rirv. 3 19,
3i1 n.78 (1976); Note, People i. Ruthe4/hrd: The Prsenior's
DtY to DiCdole, 6 (;o.DE'N (;aIT' L. Ri-,v. 851. 857 51
(1976) ("jB lefore a conviction will be reversed under ihe
Brady rule, the defense niust iert three conditions. First,
the stippres'sled evidence must e adinissile.').
," 2311 Ga. 160, 231 S.E..2d 729 (1977).
'M' d. ai 165, 231 S.E.2d at 733.
' ' 397 F. Stipp. 1(125 (N.I). Ga. 1975).
the defense tapes of conversations between a State
witness and a hypnotist made while the witness
was under hypnosis.8 17 The Georgia Supretne
Court approved of tlie suppression, reasoning that
since tite tapes were inadmzissible and since inad-
inlissible evidence need not be disclosed under
Brady, it was not error to deny the defense access to
them.' m I lowever, the United States district court,
on a petition for writ of habeas corpus, rejected the
Georgia court's interpretation of Bratr and held
that "'this court has never considered adnissibility
to be a factor under lhay. "81'
Similarly, in Shate r. crierson I M' tile )rosectior
failed to disclose a pell*.ts exctlpatoIr stateiemits
because lie believed they were hearsay and, there-
fore. inadnlmissible. The ticort rejected this reatson
as a basis for tile tiondlisclosure and held that "the
defense was entitled to tile xeullpatory evidence ill
order to investigate it and to use it both il trial
preparation and in tile trial itself. It is no answer
that the State ... believes it Could re(ject t) it wheti
offered."' "  Other courts have also rejected any
admissibility requirement. In S uder r. WVain-
wrighte.'' the court said that "even if favorable
evidence is not admissible at trial, its suppression
is constitutionally inpernissible when it is 'favtr-
able' because it is tisefill.-194
Still other colirts, instead of'oinl)pletely rejecting
the admlisibility reuiremlent. have retained it in a
highly modified form. Sotne have required the
prosecutor to disclose inadnilissible evidence only if
it could logically lead to tile discoverV of admissible
evidence. For exaniple, in U nid Shtlre. tz-Ihnutd.195
the defendant sought anong other things ile dis-
clostire of grand jury leslin-liy. I ; eI'll( t ourt, iii
explaining the parani(t.ers of the dti to disclose
said, -it is the duty of the prosecutor to (liselose
exculpatory mnaterial which mi ght not he eviden-
' Id. at 10:37 381.
'" Id, at 10:38. See Emnnett v. Stiate, 2:12 (;a. 110, 205
S.E.2d 2:11 (197.1).;,89397 F". Stipp. at 103'.9.
"'219 N.W.2d 665 (Iowa 1)7-).
191 Id. ;t 674.
"1r2 Id. Accord, Staie v. I lall, 24t9 N.W.2d 813, 11.17 (lc as
1177). ctcl. dened. ___ U.S. __ ("in inihlrialion ila v
Imiaterial and exculpatory even litiugh ililildlnsii)le a%
evidence").
15141 F. Supp. 1061 (M.). Fla. 1972).
' Id. at 1072. Se" ati Siinit Ih v. (liiled Siates, 375) F.
Stipp. 12-14, 12-1 (E.I). Va. 197-1) ('Ilit nitv et 'hicieiilt
Ito e'ltl~lish nalerialitl"i that ilhe uidisclotsetd in lhriia-
tioll, thotigh not adnis.siile into evidlete, would hawe
bcen soielhow iuscril Ito t lit defeiis- ill structlirili its
cast.").
"', Ti F.R.I). 1816 (M.ID. Pai. 1971).
"'il/. ill 192 9:.L.
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tiary itself but which might provide leads to other
evidence.' 9 7 Similarly, in United States v. Wigoda,' 98
the defendant sought the disclosure of inadmissible
witness' statements which might lead to the discov-
ery of a witness involved in a related crime who
could undermine the credibility of a Government
witness.' 9 The court noted that the admissibility
of such impeachment would be doubtful, so that
"[i]f they [the statements] did not lead to admissi-
ble evidence, the statements certainly could not
have been material in the Brady sense."
20°
Among these divergent views, the best rule seems
to be the latter, for it most closely accords with the
tenor of the Agurs opinion. Obviously, an airtight
rule eliminating the duty to disclose if the evidence
is inadmissible is too harsh on the defendant. There
will likely be times when favorable though inad-
missible evidence could, through investigation,
blossom into vital admissible defense evidence. In
such a case, the inadmissibility of the initial evi-
dence should not bar its disclosure.
On the other hand, a disclosure rule completely
eliminating consideration of admissibility of the
evidence would be too harsh on the prosecutor and
inconsistent with the Agurs opinion. Favorable ev-
idence if it is inadmissible and could not lead to
admissible evidence can have no effect on the jury
and could not create any reasonable doubt. 2°'
Therefore, a rule which would require its disclosure
would go beyond the dictates of Agurs which re-
quires the disclosure only of favorable evidence
that would create reasonable doubt.
The best approach has been taken by the Ahmad
and Wigoda courts. The fact that evidence is inad-
missible should not preclude its disclosure unless it
could not lead to any other admissible or favorable
evidence. If it could act as a lead, then that admis-
sible evidence should be weighed using the other
factors of materiality. If it is material then the
initial inadmissible evidence should have been dis-
closed. If it is not material, then disclosure is not
mandated by Agurs.
Extent of Probative Value: Exculpatory v. Impeachment
The next factor which must be considered in
determining the materiality of a favorable piece of
evidence is the nature and the probative value of
'
97 Id. at 193.
'9852 1 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1975).
'MId. at 1226-27.
2wId. at 1227.
2" But cf Smith v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1244,
1248 (E.D. Va. 1974) (inadmissible evidence could be
material if it would be useful in structuring the defend-
ant's case).
the evidence. In other words, how favorable is the
evidence?
Favorable evidence can be divided into two
broad categories: (1) evidence which exculpates the
defendant and (2) evidence which impeaches Gov-
ernment witnesses. Generally, exculpatory evidence
will be more important than impeaching evidence
because it relates directly to the facts of the case
whereas impeaching evidence relates only to the
veracity and credibility of a witness. Based on this
distinction, some courts have made a categorical
distinction between exculpatory and impeaching
evidence in terms of the standard of materiality.
For example, in Garrison v. Maggio, ' where the
prosecutor failed to disclose a prior inconsistent
statement of a victim-witness, the court held that
since the undisclosed evidence was merely im-
peaching, it need not be disclosed unless the higher
Rule33 standard of materiality is met.20 The court
said that:
[a] case such as this one, where the undisclosed
evidence is useful only for impeachment, is signifi-
cantly different from one like Agurs, where the un-
disclosed evidence was pertinent to the merits of a
self-defense claim.... [W]e are free after Agurs to
hold that an even stricter standard of materiality,
one requiring petitioner to demonstrate that the
new evidence probably would have resulted in ac-
quittal, is appropriate before a new trial must be
granted for the nondisclosure of purely impeaching
evidence.zm
Similarly, in United States v. Figurski,2w where the
defendant sought disclosure of.a presentence re-
port, the court held that "[i]f the report contains
exculpatory material, that part of the report must
be disclosed. If the report contains only material
impeaching the witness, disclosure is required only
when there is a reasonable likelihood of affecting
the trier of fact."
However, the majority of courts do not apply a
different standard of materiality, depending on
whether the evidence is exculpatory or merely im-
peaching. In United States ex rel. Annunziato v. Man-
son,20 7 where the prosecutor failed to disclose prom-
ises of leniency made to a Government witness, th&
court specifically held that:
[T]he same standard applies whether the nondis-
closed evidence goes to the fact of the crime or tends
202 540 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1976).
203 See notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text.
2N 540 F.2d at 1273-74.
205 545 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. J976).
2w Id. at 391.
207 425 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Conn. 1976), affid, 566 F.2d
410 (2d Cir. 1977).
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to impeach a critical witness.... Although the Su-
preme Court considered only exculpatory evidence
in Agurs, the Court's reasoning seems equally appli-
cable to impeachment information withheld by the
prosecution.
2 W
Numerous other courts have also applied the Agurs




Though the Agurs Court did not specifically state
that the standard of materiality should be the same
for exculpatory or impeaching evidence, there is no
indication in the opinion that any distinction
should be made. The Court established different
-standards based on the circumstances in which the
nondisclosure arose-request or no request-not
based on the nature of the allegedly favorably
evidence which was suppressed.2 0 Therefore, the
same standard of materiality should be applied
regardless of whether the evidence is exculpatory
or impeaching.
Applying the same standard, the court must
then consider as an element of materiality the
extent to which the evidence is likely to effect the
trier of fact in favor of the defendant. Clearly, if
the evidence in question is highly probative of
innocence, it will more likely be considered mate-
rial than evidence which is favorable but relatively
insignificant. In Rule 33 cases, courts have gener-
ally distinguished between exculpatory and im-
peaching evidence and have held that newly dis-
covered evidence which merely impeaches a Gov-
ernment witness is insufficient to entitle a defend-
ant to a new trial.21 ' This rigid distinction is not
viable in Brady-Agurs cases, for impeaching evi-
dence may in some circumstances be more proba-
tive of innocence than exculpatory evidence.
21 2
Therefore, the mere fact that favorable evidence is
only impeaching does not mean that it will not be
material.
In evaluating the importance of exculpatory ev-
28Id. at 1280.
29 See United States v. Washington, 550 F.2d 320 (5th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Stassi, 544 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.
1976); United States v. Hearst, 424 F. Supp. 307 (N.D.
Cal. 1976), affid, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977); Moyna-
han v. Manson, 419 F. Supp. 1139 (D. Conn. 1976);
Jefferson v. State, 141 Ga. App. 712, 234 S.E.2d 333
(1977); People v. Jones, 66 Ill. 2d 152, 361 N.E.2d 1104
(1977); State v. Bennett, 341 So. 2d 847 (La. 1976); State
v. Miller, 144 N.J. Super. 91, 364 A.2d 581 (1976).
210 427 U.S. at 106-07.
211 See United States v. Curran, 465 F.2d 260, 264 (7th
Cir. 1972). This type of reasoning has induced some
courts even after Agurs to apply a higher standard of
materiality to impeaching evidence. See cases cited in
notes 199-203 supra.
212 United States ex rel. Annunziato v. Manson, 425 F.
Supp. at 1280.
idence, the central issue to resolve is whether the
evidence is clearly exculpatory or requires arguable
inferences in order to be exculpatory. An example
of clearly exculpatory evidence was presented in
Cannon v. State,2 13 where the prosecutor failed to
disclose the existence of an eyewitness who posi-
tively identified the assailant as someone other
than the defendant. Clearly, identification evi-
dence that indicates the defendant is not the crim-
inal is highly and plainly exculpatory and should
be disclosed absent any mitigating factors.2 14 Sim-
ilarly, evidence which tends to corroborate the
defendant's testimony must be disclosed.215 On the
other hand, if the exculpatory evidence is only of
value if a number of inferences are accepted, the
favorability of that evidence is greatly diminished
and disclosure may not be required.216
In contrast to exculpatory evidence, the impor-
tance of impeaching evidence depends upon a
variety of different factors, including the type of
the impeachment, the extent of the impeachment
and the importance of the witness to the Govern-
ment's case.
217
1. Type of Impeachment. As a general rule, im-
peachment evidence will be regarded as more im-
portant and, therefore, material if it relates directly
to the facts of the case itself as opposed to generally
impeaching the veracity of the witness.218 This first
type of impeachment includes evidence of (1) bias
or interest on the part of the witness;219 (2) a
promise of leniency2 ° or threat of prosecution z22
based on whether the witness testifies; and (3) a
prior inconsistent statement as to important factsm
2 35 558 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir. 1977).
214 Id. at 1215-16. See Norris v. Slayton, 540 F.2d 1241
(4th Cir. 1976) (police report showing that witness hesi-
tated in her identification of the defendant should have
been disclosed). But cf. Wilson v. State, 372 A.2d 198
(Del. 1977) (where witness was extremely confused as to
events of crime, exculpatory statement by witness need
not be disclosed).
215 State v. Schrieber, 115 Ariz. 555, 566 P.2d 1031
(1977).216 See generally United States v. Jackson, 536 F.2d 628
(5th Cir. 1976).
217 See United States v. Figurski, 545 F.2d 389 (4th Cir.
1976).
218 United States ex rel. Annunziato v. Manson, 425 F.
Supp. 1272 (D. Conn. 1976), affld, 566 F.2d 410 (2d Cir.
1977).
219 id.
220 United States v. McCrane, 547 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.
1976); Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Smith, 538 F.2d 1332 (8th Cir. 1976).
22' United States v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir.
1976); Moynahan v. Manson, 419 F. Supp. 1139 (D.
Conn. 1976).
m Garrison v. Maggio, 540 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1976);
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or a prior misidentification. m Because these types
of evidence directly impeach the witness' credibil-
ity as to the particular facts in issue, they are
generally regarded as important.
On the other hand, impeachment evidence
which only attacks- the witness' credibility in gen-
eral is considered less important. Impeachment of
this type includes (1) evidence of prior bad acts; VA
(2) promises of leniency or rewards received in
prior cases; and (3) indictments or prior convic-
tions on unrelated charges.N
This distinction was clearly explained in United
States ex rel Annunziato v. Manson.227 In Manson, the
prosecutor had disclosed to the defense a Govern-
ment witness' prior convictions, former drug use
and prior deals made with the Government in
other cases.m However, the prosecutor failed to
reveal promises of leniency made to the witness in
return for his testimony at this particular trial.2
The court held that the undisclosed evidence was
not merely cumulative to the other impeaching
evidence:
[While the witness'] record of prior convictions and
drug use may have borne on his general credibility,
these bad acts did not show a continuing ulterior
motive or bias for testifying... There is a sharp
difference between leniency afforded for convictions
in the past and promises of more leniency in the
future for additional offenses on which he was still
open to conviction °
Therefore, the court reversed the conviction for the




2. Extent of Impeachment. In addition to consider-
ing the type of impeachment, it is also necessary to
determine the extent of the impeachment. 2 Ob-
viously, if the impeaching evidence is devastating,
proving the witness to be totally untrustworthy,
Carter v. State, 237 Ga. 617, 229 S.E.2d 411 (1976);
Loveday v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 503, 247 N.W.2d 116 (1976).
223 Norris v. Slayton, 540 F.2d 1241 (4th Cir. 1976);
McDonald v. State, 553 P.2d 171 (Okla. Crim. 1976).
224 United States v. Stassi, 544 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976).
See also United States ex reL Annunziato v. Manson,
425 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Conn. 1976), alf'd, 566 F.2d 410
(2d Cir. 1977).
225 United States v. Masri, 547 F.2d 932 (5th Cir.
1977).
22State v. Miller, 144 N.J. Super. 91, 364 A.2d 581
(1976).
227 425 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Conn. 1976), afl'd, 566 F.2d
410 (2d Cir. 1977).





' See United States v. Figurski, 545 F.2d 389, 392 (4th
Cir. 1976).
that evidence is more important than impeaching
evidence which is vague or equivocal or based on
a series of extended inferences.
For example, the failure to disclose a prior in-
consistent statement will normally violate Agurs if
the inconsistency is pronounced and probative.
However, if the inconsistencies between the prior
statement and the trial testimony are slight, Agurs
does not mandate its disclosure.2- Similarly, if the
evidence only partially or "arguably" impeaches a
witness, it is less likely to be considered material! a4
In United States v. Hedgeman, - a Government
witness, Pearson, testified that he gave the defend-
ant kickbacks on reconstruction contracts and pro-
duced documents containing notations as to the
amounts paid by him to the defendant. 26 Pearson
also testified that he had not had the documents
tested to determine the age of the writing.2 37 The
prosecutor failed to disclose a statment made to
him by a document examiner that there were spots
on the documents indicating a "test for ink."
The defendant claimed that this statement contra-
dicted Pearson's claim that he had not had the ink
tested for age and showed that he had tested them
for age. This fact, defense counsel argued, proved
that Pearson fabricated the documents, made these
notations at a later time and was checking to see if
their age could be determined. The court rejected
the defense contention that the failure to disclose
violated Agurs because the undisclosed statement
was not clearly contrary to Pearson's testimony
2 39
and its impeachment value was limited because it
was based on a series of inferences not proven.240
Thus, if impeaching evidence is not clearly im-
peaching, but only claimed so based on argument
and inference, it is less likely to be considered
material.ss t
3. Importance of the Witness. A third, extremely
important consideration in determining the pro-
23 Jefferson v. State, 141 Ga. App. 712, 234 S.E.2d 333
(1977); People v. Jones, 66 Ill. 2d 152, 361 N.E.2d 1104
(1977).
23
4 United States v. Hearst, 424 F. Supp. 307 (N.D.
Cal. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977).
23 564 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1977).
2'6 Id. at 764.
W7Id.
zMId. at 765.
2_ Pearson testified that he had not tested the docu-
ments to determine the age of the writing. The document
examiner stated that some test had been made; but he
could not tell what kind of test. Therefore, the two are
not necessarily inconsistent.
240 Id. at 766-67.
24 United States v. Hearst, 424 F. Supp. 307 (N.D.
Cal. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977); State v.
Pevia. 30 N.C. App. 79, 226 S.E.2d 394 (1976).
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bative value of the impeaching evidence is the
importance of the witness against whom the im-
peaching evidence would be used. 2 If a Govern-
ment witness is relatively unimportant to the Gov-
ernment's case or if the witness is corroborated by
other witnesses, it is less likely that evidence which
impeaches his credibility will be material. 43
In United States v. Lasky,2 " a drug prosecution, a
Government witness testified to the defendant's
involvement in later drug transactions to establish
the defendant's knowledge and intent.m Although
the Government disclosed that the witness had
made two prior trips to Mexico to import cocaine,
it failed to disclose two additional trips wherein he
smuggled marihuana. 246 The court held, however,
that the failure to disclose this evidence did not
violate the Agurs standard because the witness (1)
was not involved in the crime on trial, (2) did not
directly link the defendant with the particular
crime and (3) only testified as to. the defendant's
knowledge and intent. 7 Since "other testimony,
standing alone, clearly and convincingly estab-
lished the defendant's guilt," the court held that
any further evidence affecting the witness' credi-
bility "would not create a reasonable doubt that
did not otherwise exist." Similarly, in Brach v.
United States,24 9 where the witness' testimony was
not that inculpatory and was corroborated by three
other witnesses, the court held that the prosecutor's
failure to disclose that the witness was presently
charged with a crime did not violate the Agurs
standard.250
On the other hand, if the undisclosed evidence
impeaches a crucial Government witness, it is much
more likely that the evidence will be considered
material. In Ex parte Turner,' where the prosecu-
tor's case was based primarily on one agent,
Harden, the court held that "any fact or circum-
stance from which a juror might reasonably infer
242 United States v. Figurski, 545 F.2d 389, 391 (4th
Cir. 1976).
m" See United States v. Hedgeman, 564 F.2d 763 (7th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Lasky, 548 F.2d 835 (9th Cir.
1977); Brach v. United States, 542 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976);
United States v. Hearst, 424 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Cal.
1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977); People v.
Jones, 66 111. 2d 152, 361 N.E.2d 1104 (1977).
2 548 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1977).
245 Id. at 838-40.
246 Id. at 839.
24 Id. at 839-40.
m Id. at 840.
249 542 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
2 0°Id. at 6-7.
25'545 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
motive for said Harden to fabricate or a willingness
to do so or that might tend to corroborate peti-
tioner's version was critical to petitioner's
defense"2 2 and must be disclosed. Similarly, other
courts have considered the importance of the wit-
ness as a major factor in determining the material-
ity of impeaching evidence.53
Thus, the determination of the nature and pro-
bative value of the undisclosed evidence is an
important consideration which is often quite com-
plex. When dealing with exculpatory evidence
which generally relates directly to the facts of the
case, the determination may be relatively easy, for
the court need only determine how probative the
evidence is. However, when reviewing impeaching
evidence, the analysis becomes more complicated
as a number of factors must be considered to
determine its probative value. Therefore, courts are
generally willing to assign greater weight and
therefore, materiality to exculpatory as opposed to
impeaching evidence.
Cumulative Evidence
Another factor which is related to and assists in
determining the value of a piece of evidence is
whether the evidence is cumulative of other evi-
dence already adduced at trial. The Agurs Court
held that evidence is "material" is it "creates a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.,
254
Based on this language, prosecutors have argued
that if the undisclosed evidence is merely cumula-
tive of evidence already presented at trial, then it
is impossible for it to create any new reasonable
doubt. Generally, the lower courts have refused to
take this strict approach, but they do consider the
cumulative nature of the evidence as one important
factor limiting the duty to disclose.Y5
Numerous courts, when confronted with undis-
closed evidence which is merely cumulative of ev-
idence introduced at trial, have refused to hold it
to be material. For example, in Agurs, the prose-
cutor failed to disclose the victim's criminal rec-
ord.2m However, since this evidence "was largely
cumulative of the evidence that Sewell [the victim]
252 Id. at 473.
253 See United States v. McCrane, 547 F.2d 204 (3d
Cir. 1976); United States v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239 (4th
Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Annunziato v. Manson,
425 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Conn. 1976), af/'d, 566 F.2d 410
(2d Cir. 1977); Moynahan v. Manson, 419 F. Supp. 1139
(D. Conn. 1976).
2427 U.S. at 112 (emphasis added).
2 5 See United States v. Figurski, 545 F.2d 389 (4th Cir.
1976).
256 427 U.S. at 100-01.
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was wearing a bowie knife in a sheath and carrying
a second knife," it was not material.
This issue of cumulative evidence most often
arises in the area of impeaching evidence where
the defense learns of other evidence after trial
which could have been used to further impeach a
government witness. Generally, where a witness
has undergone substantial impeachment at trial,
other impeaching evidence of the same character
will not likely be material under Agurs.2' s For ex-
ample, in State v. Bennett,s 9 the prosecutor failed to
disclose statements made by Meisner, a state wit-
ness, which defense counsel claimed showed that
Meisner's identification of the defendant was ini-
tially weak. 260 However, defense counsel on cross-
examination of Meisner, was able to establish the
weakness of the initial identification.2 6' Therefore,
in response to defense counsel's claim that the
failure to disclose these statements violated Agurs,
the court h ld that "since defense counsel contends
that the statements given to the police officer would
only show that Meisner's identification was weak,
an aspect already brought out, it cannot fairly be
said that the omitted evidence 'creates a reasonable
doubt that did not otherwise exist.' ,,262
Similarly, in Carter v. State,206 where "there was
abundant other evidence at trial which would
impeach this witness' credibility," the failure to
disclose a prior inconsistent statement removing
the defendant from the scene of the crime "is not
enough to conclude appellant was denied a fair
trial. 2 6 Other courts have refused to reverse con-
victions where the undisclosed evidence was culu-
lative of other impeachment at trial.26
257 Id. at 114. See also United States v. Miller, 529 F.2d
1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 1976) (witness' confession of com-
pleting a false tax return was cumulative where another
witness already testified that the first witness prepared
the return; nondisclosure was not error).
258 But, if the new impeaching evidence is not of the
same character it may not be cumulative. See United
States ex rel. Annunziato v. Manson, 425 F. Supp. 1272
(D. Conn. 1976), af'd, 566 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1977).
259 341 So. 2d 847 (La. 1976).
260 Id. at 852.
261 Id. at 853.
= Id.263 237 Ga. 617, 229 S.E.2d 411 (1976).
24 Id. at 619-20, 229 S.E.2d at 414.
'25See Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1977); United States v. Hedgeman, 564 F.2d 763 (7th
Cir. 1977) (using lower standard); United States v.
Brown, 562 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Washington, 550 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Figurski, 545 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1976); Brach v. United
States, 542 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Smith,
If, on the other hand, the witness has not been
subject to any prior impeachment of if the undis-
closed evidence is of a different character than that
adduced at trial, it will more likely be material.
For example, in Moynahan v. Manson' s the prose-
cutor failed to disclose that one of its witnesses had
been a target of the investigation but was never
charged.2 In finding that the undisclosed evi-
dence was material, the court noted that "[g]iven
the fact that Miller [the witness] was the State's
only 'clean' witness, and that the prosecutor em-
phasized this in his argument, ... the suppressed
evidence does give rise to reasonable doubt as to
the petitioner's guilt. 268 Also, if the undisclosed
evidence is of a different, more damaging charac-
ter, it will not be cumulative, and, therefore, it will
more likely be material.2 Thus, the cumulative
nature of the undisclosed evidence is an important
factor limiting the duty to disclose. Where the
evidence is only cumulative of other evidence pre-
sented at trial, the courts are reticent to hold that
it "creates a reasonable doubt that did not other-
wise exist."
Weight of the Evidence
The next extremely important factor to consider
in determining materiality is the weight and the
strength of the other evidence presented at trial.
This consideration was clearly set forth in Agurs
where the court said that:
[TJhe omission must be evaluated in the context of
the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt
about guilt whether or not the additional evidence
is considered, there is no justification for a new trial.
On the other hand, if the verdict is already of
questionable validity, additional evidence of rela-
tively minor importance might be sufficient to cre-
ate a reasonable doubt 70
538 F.2d 1332 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. McCrane,
436 F. Supp. 760 (M.D. Pa. 1977); United States v.
Hearst, 424 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Cal. 1976), affid, 563"F.2d
1331 (9th Cir. 1977); Frank v. State, 558 S.W.2d 12 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1977).
266 419 F. Supp. 1139 (D. Conn. 1976).
267 Id at 1145.
Id. at 1147.
See United States ex re. Annunziato v. Manson, 425
F. Supp. 1272 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 566 F.2d 410 (2d
Cir. 1977). But cf United States v. Smith, 538 F.2d 1332
(8th Cir. 1976) (where the witness has been impeached
by prior convictions, prior threats to the defendant and
dropping of charges, evidence of deal made with the
Government is cumulative and not material).
27o 42 7 U.S. at 113.
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Generally, lower courts have applied this analysis
and have viewed the undisclosed evidence in the
context of the entire record to determine if the
additional evidence creates a reasonable doubt.
2 7 1
The stronger and more conclusive the evidence
presented at trial, the less likely that the undis-
closed evidence will be material. This principle is
clearly demonstrated by the facts in State v.
Miller.27 2 In Miller, a robbery and assault and bat-
tery prosecution, the defendant who robbed a store
was seen and identified at trial by two eyewit-
nesses.273 As the defendant ran from the store, he
was pursued by two police officers who both later
identified him at trial.274 The defendant, while
fleeing, also, shot one of the officers.2 75 Another
witness, Joyner, saw the shooting and later identi-
fied the defendant at trial. 6 Also introduced at
trial was the defendant's gun which was shown to
have fired the bullet which struck the officer 277 and
the defendant's confession.2 7 8 After trial, defense
counsel learned that Joyner was under indictment
prior to the robbery and dt.ring trial, and defense
counsel claimed that this impeaching evidence
should have been disclosed under Agurs 27 9 The
court, however, rejected this contention based on
an evaluation of the nondisclosure "in the context
of the entire record," and said that, "[E]ven if
Joyner were lying in expectation of favorable treat-
ment by the State, the remaining evidence ... was
so great as to preclude any reasonable doubt about
the defendant's guilt." 28 Thus the failure to dis-
close did not violate Agurs.
Consequently, if the evidence adduced at trial is
extremely strong, even exculpatory evidence which
is generally considered highly probative may not
be held material.28i Moreover, if the undisclosed
evidence is merely impeaching and there is suffi-
cient proof of guilt without the witness whose
271 See United States v. Washington, 550 F.2d 320 (5th
Cir. 1977); Jefferson v. State, 141 Ga. App. 712, 234
S.E.2d 333 (1977); People v. Jones, 66 Ill. 2d 152, 361
N.E.2d 1104 (1977).
272 144 N.J. Super. 91, 364 A.2d 581 (1976).
273 Id. at 92-93, 97, 364 A.2d at 582, 584.





27 Id. at 93, 364 A.2d at 582. The prosecutor made no
deals or promises to Joyner in return for his testimony.
m ld. at 97, 364 A.2d at 584. See also United States v.
Corr, 434 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
28' See 427 U.S. at 112-13 n.21; United States v. Oliver,
No. 77-1181 (1st Cir. Feb. 17, 1978); Frank v. State, 558
S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
testimony would be impeached it is unlikely that
the nondisclosure would violate Agurs. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Lasky, s2 the court held that
impeaching evidence was not material where "the
other testimony, standing alone, clearly and con-
vincingly established the defendant's guilt.
''
On the other hand, where the evidence of guilt
is relatively weak or is based primarily on the
testimony of one witness, favorable evidence of
relatively insignificant character may be consid-
ered material.2" In United States v. McCrane,' 85 one
witness' testimony as to a conversation with the
defendant five years earlier was the sole support for
two counts of the indictment. 286 The prosecutor
hadfailed to disclose the existence of letters written
by the Government on the witness' behalf to the
witness' prospective customers and defense counsel
asserted a Brady violation.287 The court reversed a
lower court decision for the Government holding
that since "this case is one where the verdict has
only slight support and 'additional evidence of
relatively minor importance might be sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt,"' the Government
should have disclosed these letters, for "prospects
of favorable treatment or financial gain are matters
which must be weighed."'  Thus, where evidence
adduced at trial is fairly weak, favorable evidence
will much more likely be considered material. 289
The weight of the evidence should be one of the
most crucial considerations in determining mate-
riality in that the primary concern of the Agurs
Court was the "justice of the finding of guilt" in
the case.2 ° The Court focused not on the proce-
dural rights of the defendant but rather on the
central issue of guilt. Therefore, when evidence of
guilt is strong, the undisclosed evidence must be
extremely favorable before it will be considered
material.
548 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1977).IOld. at 840. For similar reasoning and result, see
United States v. Hedgeman, 564 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Hearst, 424 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Cal.
1976), afj'd, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977); Loveday v.
State, 74 Wis. 2d 503, 247 N.W.2d 116 (1976).
mSee 427 U.S. at 113.
m 547 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1976).
28 Id. at 206.
8 Id.
2m Id. at 206-07.
28 See Cannon v. State, 558 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Sutton 542 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1976);
Ex arte Turner, 545 S.W.2d 470 (Trex. Crim. App. 1977).
427 U.S. at 112 ("The proper standard of material-
ity must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of
the finding of guilt.").
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DEFERENCE TO-1 THE TRIAL JUDGE
Reviewing courts, in addition to considering the
other factors of materiality, also give weight to the
trial judge's decision and treat it as a factor in
making their determination. This policy of defer-
ence to the trial judge's opinion probably stems
from dicta in the Agurs opinion. In Agurs, the Court
noted that since "the trial judge remained con-
vinced of respondent's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and since we are satisfied that his firsthand
appraisal was thorough and entirely reasonable we
hold" that the nondisclosure did not violate due
process.
29 1
In Brach v. United States,9 2 the court stated that
"the thrust of the Agurs majority view is that the
unqualified finding by the trial judge that the
respondent was guilty was enough to defeat the
motion for a new trial."' 29 Other courts have not
interpreted Agurs to give that much deference to
the trial judge; however, most do consider the trial
judge's decision as a factor because of his firsthand
observation.
In McDonald v. State,"29 4 the court in analyzing the
materiality of certain evidence states, "[I]n making
this determination we observe the trial judge ruled
upon this issue with a firsthand appraisal of the
credibility and the demeanor ofJenkins [the State's
witness]."2 5 Therefore, since there was neither spe-
cific request nor perjury, "we find no reason to
disturb the trial judge's ruling."9 Other courts
have similarly affirmed the trial judge's decision
where other factors were insufficient to warrant its
change. 
29 7
Although it might be contended that deference
should only be given to the trial judge in cases
where there was a bench trial because only in such
a case can the judge definitely weigh the effect of
the new evidence on the trier of fact, the courts
have not done so. Rather they have given deference
in both jury and nonjury cases. 89 8 However, it must
2' 427 U.S. at 114.
292 542 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
293 Id. at 6.
2 553 P.2d 171 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976).
"' Id. at 181.
a-Id.
• 
7 See United States v. Mackey, No. 77-1074 (7th Cir.
Feb. 22, 1978)" United States v. Masri, 547 F.2d 932 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977); United States v.
Jackson. 536 F.2d 628 (5th Cir. 1976).
298 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)
(jury); United States v. Masri, 547 F.2d 932 (5th Cir.).
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977) (bench): Brach v. United
States, 542 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976) (jury): McDonald v.
State, 553 P.2d 171 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (jury).
be made clear that this deference is merely one of
the factors considered by the reviewing court. The
trial judge's ruling bears with it no presumption of
correctness which must be overcome by the oppos-
ing party.
TIMING
Once it has been determined that a piece of
evidence must be disclosed, a secondary issue whi-h
arises is when must that disclosure be made. Un-
fortunately, the Supreme Court has never ad-
dressed this issue and, therefore no definitive guide-
lines exist.m
Numerous courts have taken the position that
Brady does not require pretrial disclosure. In United
States ex rel. Lucas v. Regan, °0 the prosecutor failed
to disclose until the second day of trial that the
victim had previously identified someone other
than the defendant as the man who had robbed
her.O' Although the defense claimed that this evi-
dence should have been disclosed before trial to
allow ample time to locate the other person, the
court disagreed; "Neither Brady nor any other case
we know of requires that disclosures under Brady
must be made before trial."30 2 Similarly, in United
States v. Zit,e, att where the defendant moved for a
pretrial order directing the prosecutor to disclose
all favorable or exculpatory evidence, the court
denied the motion and stated: "Brady tn Maryland
did not deal in any way with pretrial discovery....
'[N]o pretrial remedies were intended to be created"
by Brady.' ' 04 Other courts have also rejected argu-
ments that Brady requires pretrial disclosure.
a30
On the other hand, several commentators have
See Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the
Prosecution-The Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50
N.C.L. R-v. 437, 452 (1972): Note, The Prosecutor's Duty
to Disclose after United States v. Agurs, 1977 U. Ii.i.. L.F. 690,
691; Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Dity
to Disclose. 40 U. CHi. L. R-v. 112. 117 (1972).
503 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1974). cert. denied, 420 U.S. 939
(1975).
wi ld. at 2-3.
3 2 Id. at 3 n.l.
30 299 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
04 Id. at 1274 (quoting United States v. Manhattan
Brush Co., 38 F.R.D. 4, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)).
' United States v. Moore, 439 F.2d 1107 (6th Cir.
1971): United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958 (1970); United States v. Sklaroff.
323 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Fla. 1971); United States v.
Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.J. 1968); United States
v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). United
States v. Manhattan Brush Co., 38 F.R.D. 4 (S.D.N.Y.
1965). See also Circuit Notes: Criminal, 65 G-o. L.J. 209,
320 n.715 (as a general rule, Brady is not a pretrial
remedy).
suggested that in order for Brady to be effective,
disclosure should be made before trial to allow the
defense to fully investigate and develop the favor-
able evidence.w Furthermore, the ABA Standards
Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial
provide that "[t]he prosecuting attorney shall dis-
close to defense counsel any material or informa-
tion within his possession or control which tends to
negate the guilt of the accused or would tend to
reduce his punishment therefore."'' 0 7 "The prose-
cutor should perform these obligations as soon as
practicable following the filing of charges against the
accused."" Also, the ABA Standards Relating to
the Prosecution Function and the Defense Func-
tion provide that "[iut is unprofessional conduct for
a prosecutor to fail to disclose to the defense at the
earliest feasible opportunity evidence which would tend
to negate the guilt of the accused or might mitigate




Consequently, many courts recommend that the
prosecutor disclose Brady material as soon as possi-
ble, preferably pretrial. In United States v. Deutsch,"'0
where the defendant moved for production by the
government of all exculpatory material, the court
held" 'that evidence in the government's possession
favorable to the defendant should be made avail-
able to him far enough in advance of trial to allow
him sufficient time for its evaluation, preparation,
and presentation at trial.' ,311 Similarly, in United
States v. Pollack, 12 the court said that "[d]isclosure
by the government must be made at such a time as
to allow the defense to use the favorable material
effectively in the preparation and presentation of
306 See Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's
Duty, to Disclose, 40 U. CHI. L. Riiv. 112, 118 (1972)
(pretrial disclosure seems the best alternative); Comment,
The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the
Defendant, 74 YAi.F L.J. 136, 149 (1964) ("the only rea-
sonable time for the prosecutor to reveal his evidence is
during the pretrial period"); 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRA(-
IICE 16.08 (2), 16-95 (on the basis of policy the Brady
doctrine should be applied to pretrial discovery).
307ABA PROIJI-c'" ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAl. JUSIICE, Standards Relating To Discovery
and Procedure Before Trial § 2.1(c) (Approved Draft,
1970).
38Id. at § 2.2(a).
3 ABA PROJECr ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAl. JUSTIC-, Standar-J Relating to the Prosecu-
tion Function and the Defense Function § 3.11(a) (Ten-
tative Draft, 1970).
31o 373 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
311 Id. at 290 (quoting United States v. Partin, 320 F.
Supp. 275, 285 (E.D. La. 1970)).
312534 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924
(1976).
its case, even if satisfaction of this criterion requires
pre-trial disclosure. ' ' : 3 Other courts have also rec-
ommended early disclosure.
3 1 4
It is generally agreed, however, that the mere
fact that the prosecutor makes a late disclosure at
trial does not automatically constitute error.3 15 Al-
though some courts have recommended pretrial
disclosure of Brady material, later disclosure at
trial316 will be sufficient to satisfy the requirements
of due process unless the defendant can prove that
the delay prejudiced his case.3 17 For example, in
United States v. Kaplan,3t 8 the prosecutor disclosed
documents which could be used to impeach a
Government witness after that witness had testi-
fied.3 19 Defense counsel was then given two days to
review the documents and then used some of them
to cross-examine and impeach the Government
witness."2° Although the defense claimed that the
delayed disclosure violated Brady, the court held:
Although the prosecution's turnover was late, we
found no prejudice since it occurred during trial
and the evidence was submitted to the jury. If
exculpatory evidence can be effectively presented at
trial and the defendant is not prevented by lack of
time to make needed investigation, there is no re-
313 id. at 973.
314 United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 577 (3d Cir.
1977); United States v. Bonnano, 430 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964 (1970): United States v. Elnore,
423 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1970). United States v. Houston,
339 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. Elcy,
335 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ga. 1972); United States v.
Ahmad, 53 F.R.D. 186 (M.D. Pa. 1971); United States v.
White, 50 F.R.D. 70 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd. 450 F.2d 264 (5th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Ladd, 48 F.R.D. 266 (D.
Alaska 1969); United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).315 See United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 577, 580 (3d
Cir. 1977) ("A delayed disclosure by the prosecution is
not per se reversible error."): United States v. Miller, 529
F.2d 1125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 924 (1976).
"16Clearly, disclosure after the jury has retired will
always be too late. See Hlamric v. Bailey, 386 F.2d 390
(4th Cir. 1967).
.11 See United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 577 (3d Cir.
1977); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976): United States v. Miller.
529 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 924 (1976);
Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 940 (1974); United States v. Stone, 471 F.2d
170 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973);
United States v. Elmore, 423 F.2d 775 (4th Cir. 1970);
United States v. McFarland, 371 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967); Commonwealth v. Ellis,
364 N.E.2d 808 (Mass. 1977).
3M 554 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977).
319 Id. at 578.
-32 Id. at 579.
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versible prosecutorial conduct in ill-timed presen-
tation.
3 2
This "prejudice" test is probably the best rule in
light of Agurs and is generally applied by the courts.
A strict rule not requiring disclosure until trial is
too harsh on the defendant, for there are clearly
situations where disclosure at trial comes too late
for the defendant to make effective use of the
favorable evidence. For example, in Grant v. Alld-
redge, 2 the Government failed to disclose to the
defense until after Harris, the Government witness,
had testified that Harris had previously identified
a person other than the defendant as the perpetra-
tor of the crimeYm This information, the court
held, "was without question '"specific, concrete
evidence" of a nature requiring pretrial disclosure
to allow for full exploration and exploitation by
the defense,'" ... because "the particular disclo-
sure might have led, had it been made well in
advance of trial, to other significant infor-
mation."'
'
On the other hand, a rule requiring pretrial
disclosure in all cases would be too harsh on the
prosecutor, inconsistant with the Agurs opinion and
unwise from a practical standpoint. The Agurs
Court clearly interpreted Brady to establish a sub-
stantive right to a fair trial and not procedural
rights of discovery.32 5 Therefore, disclosure at any-
time would satisfy Brady so long as the defendant
still receives a fair trial. Furthermore, in some cases
early disclosure may not be feasible if it might (1)
present dangers to prospective witnesses, (2) enable
the defense to bribe or prepare perjured witnesses
or (3) enable the defense to create a tailored de-
fense. 26 Moreover, often the favorability of a piece
321 Id. at 580. See cases cited therein.
322 498 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1974).
3 Id. at 379-80.
324 Id. at 382 (quoting United States v. Gleason, 265 F.
Supp. 880, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)). See United States v.
Deutsch, 373 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United
States v. Partin, 320 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. La. 1970). See
also Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590, 598 (W.D.N.Y.
1977) ("In order to maintain the integrity of the plea
bargaining process and to assure that a guilty plea en-
tered by a defendant is done so voluntarily, knowlingly
and intelligently, a prosecutor has a duty, during the
course of plea bargaining, to disclose to the defendant
evidence that is as clearly exculpatory of certain elements
of the crime charged as is the contested evidence in this
case.").
32' Cf. 427 U.S. at 107-08.
S26See United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 974
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976); United States
v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880,887 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); People
v..Jones, 87 Misc. 2d 931, 387 N.Y.S.2d 779, 785 (1976).
of evidence cannot be determined until the defend-
ant presents his defense, so that pretrial disclosure
would be an impossible guess. For example, if the
prosecutor has information that the defendant is
mentally unstable and the defense turns out to be
self-defense then such information would be irrel-
evant and not favorable. Thus, the prejudice test
as opposed to a strict rule requiring pretrial disclo-
sure represents a fair balance between "the poten-
tial dangers of early discovery ... [and] the need
that Brady purports to serve of avoiding wrongful
convictions.
3 27
In determining what type of evidence must be
disclosed early and what types may be disclosed
later without error, a possible distinction might be
made between exculpatory and impeaching evi-
dence. If the Brady material is exculpatory, it will
generally require some investigation and prepara-
tion in order to present it effectively to the jury.
For example, in Alldredge the eviden e of misiden-
tification would only be of substantial value if the
defense could have expanded upon it.328
On the other hand, if the Brady material consists
solely of impeaching evidence, a delay in disclosure
until trial will rarely result in prejudice because it
can generally be used effectively at trial on cross-
examination without extensive investigation or
preparation. 32This distinction, however, has not
been rigidly followed, for some courts have held
that the late disclosure of exculpatory evidence is
not error,= and others have held that the late
disclosure of impeaching evidence is error 321 The
327 See United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 974
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976).
m 498 F.2d at 381.
329 See Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974); United States v. Mc-
Farland, 371 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
906 (1967); United States v. Sherman, 426 F. Supp. 85
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
m United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976); United States v. Miller,
529 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 924 (1976).
See also ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standards Relating to the Prosecu-
tion Function and the Defense Function § 3.11(a) (com-
mentary) (Tentative Draft, 1970) ("clearly exculpatory
evidence must be disclosed; as to material which would
only substantially aid the defense"-area is too vague to
establish standards of conduct).
33' United States v. Dillard, 419 F. Supp. 1000 (N.D.
Ill. 1976) (the prosecutor must inform the defendant of
grants of immunity prior to trial). But cf United States v.
Sherman, 426 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (disclosure of
promises of immunity is timely if given on the evening
prior to the day the witness is to testify).
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best approach remains a general one based on
whether or not the delay created prejudice.
Another related timing issue which has caused
controversy in federal cases concerns the relation-
ship between Brady disclosures and Jencks Act dis-
closures.43 The Jencks Act requires the prosecution
to turn over to the defense any prior statements of
a witness who testifies; however, the disclosure need
not be made until after the witness has testified or
direct examination.33 If a Government witness has
made a statement which contains favorable evi-
dence to the defense, both the Brady rule and the
Jencks Act apply, resulting in a peculiar timing
problem as to which rule governs.4 Few courts
have considered the timing aspects of this conflict,
and those which have are not in accord.
In United States v. Dotson, W5 the defendant sought
but was denied the pretrial production of all ex-
culpatory statements made by two of his accom-
plices.= Although the accomplices' statements
were disclosed at trial before each witness testified
and were used for impeachment purposes, the de-
fendant claimed that Brady entitled him to earlier
disclosure.3 7 The court rejected this contention
and held:
[Tlhe appellant ignores the Jencks Act, which
clearly prohibits the discovery of statements until
after they have testified. 18 U.S.C. § 3500. This court
and others have recognized that the rule announced
in Brady is not a pretrial remedy and was not
intended to override the mandate of the Jencks
Act.a-1
3 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
3 18 U.S.C. § 3500 reads as follows:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the
United States, no statement or report in the posses-
sion of the United States which was made by a
Government witness ... to an agent of the Govern-
ment shall be the subject of subpena, discovery, or
inspection until said witness has testified on direct
examination in the trial of the case. (b) After a
witness called by the United States has testified on
direct examination, the court shall, on motion of
the defendant, order the United States to produce
any statement ... of the witness in the possession of
the United States which relates to the subject matter
as to which the witness has testified....
'
14 See generally Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the
Prosecution's Duty to Disclose, 40 U. CH. L. REV. 112,
118-20 (1972).
' 546 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1977).
'Id. at 1152.
3
7 Id. at 1152-53.
= Id. at 1153 (quoting United States v. Scott, 524 F.2d
465,467-68 (5th Cir. 1975)). See United States v. Montos,
421 F.2d 215, 221 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1022
(1970) ("due process does not require premature produc-
Some courts, on the other hand, have deter-
mined that the Brady rule governs any timing
conflict between the two rules. In United States v.
Gleason, 339 the court stated in dictum:
[Tihere are kinds of exculpatory evidence of which
a defendant should properly be apprised before trial
in order to prepare and present an effective defense.
If it should happen that such evidence is part of a
statement covered by the Jencks Act, the statutory
restrictions must be accommodated to the demands
of due process.
340
Other courts have adopted similar positions.34 '
Clearly, the Gleason approach is the better and
more correct rule. Since Brady is predicated on
constitutional grounds and theJencks Act is merely
a federal statute, Brady should override any restric-
tions placed on it by statute. Although Brady should
govern when the two rules overlap, this does not
mean that all Brady-Jencks material must be dis-
closed before the trial. Brady material, as stated
before, need not be disclosed in advance of trial
unless the delay would cause prejudice." There-
fore, if Brady-Jenecks material can be used effec-
tively at trial, even though it is not disclosed until
after the witness has testified, the delay of that
disclosure would not be error. 
3
THE DurY -1O PRESERVE
A final question which, like the timing issue, the
Supreme Court has not yet resolved, is how to treat
a case where potential Brady material has been lost
or destroyed by the Government. In other words,
does the Brady duty to disclose imply a correspond-
ing duty to preserve and, if so, what is the extent
of the accompanying duty?
In United States v. Augenblick, 3" where the prose-
tion at pretrial hearings on motions to suppress state-
ments ultimately subject to discovery under the Jencks
Act").
m 265 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
340Id. at 887.
34 See United States v. Leichtfuss, 331 F. Supp. 723,
735 (N.D. Ill. 1971) ("If such notes ... constitute 'state-
ments of government witnesses' within the meaning of
the Jencks Act, they are produceable [sic] at trial. If said
notes [are] favorable to the accused within the meaning
of Brady, the government is obligated to produce such
evidence now [i.e., pretrial]."). See also United States v.
Trainor, 423 F.2d 263, 264 (1st Cir. 1970).
342 See note 315 supra and accompanying text.
343 See United States v. Trainor, 423 F.2d 263, 264 (1st
Cir. 1970) ("there can be no reversible error unless the
delay in disclosure was prejudicial'). See also United
States v. Gleason, 265 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
34 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
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cutor lost tapes of an interrogation made of a
Government witness, the Court implied that the
Jencks Act duty to disclose a witness' pretrial state-
ment imposes a duty on the prosecutor to preserve
that statement. The Court said that "the Govern-
ment bore the burden of producing [the tapes] or
explaining why it could not do so.
' ' 45
Analogizing to Augenblick, lower courts have gen-
erally agreed that Brady necessarily implies a duty
to preserve to ensure the viability of the disclosure
requirement. However, the scope of that duty to
preserve and the sanctions imposed upon failure to
preserve have not been clearly established.
The first court to establish the duty to preserve
as an adjunct to the Brady disclosure duty was the
District of Columbia Circuit in United States v.
Bryant.Y In Bryant, a drug prosecution, the Govern-
ment had recorded conversations between the de-
fendant and Pope, and undercover agent, concern-
ing the drug transaction upon which the indict-
ment was based. 7 In response to the defense's
request for the tape, the Government replied that
it had been lost.m Since the tape was no longer in
the possession of the government, the prosecutor
argued that "loss per se is enough to defeat the duty
of disclosure"' ' 9 because it would be impossible to
evaluate whether the evidence was favorable to the
defendant.3 ° However, the court rejected this rea-
soning and stated that "[w]ere Brady and its prog-
eny applicable only when the exact content of the
non-disclosed materials was known, the disclosure
duty would be an empty promise, easily circum-
vented ... by means of destruction rather than
mere failure to reveal. ' ' 5t Therefore, the court
held:
[B]efore a request for discovery has been made, the
duty of disclosure is operative as a duty of preser-
vation.... Accordingly, we hold that sanctions for
non-disclosure based on loss of evidence will be
invoked in the future unless the Government can
show that it has promulgated, enforced and at-
tempted in good faith to follow rigorous and sys-
tematic procedures designed to presene alldiscoverable
evidence gathered in the course of a criminal investi-
gation.
352
35 Id. at 355-56.
N6439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
' Id. at 644-45.
m Id. at 646.
9Jd. at 650.
3 o Id. at 648.
51 id.
3 2 Id. at 651, 652 (emphasis added). For the most
recent cases implying a duty to preserve, see Gov't of the
Virgin Islands v. Testamark, No. 77-1567 (3d Cir. Dec.
With respect to what constitutes "discoverable ev-
idence" in terms of Brady, the court explained that,
"in framing their rules for evidence preservation,
investigative agencies must define discoverable ev-
idence very broadly, including any materials that
'might' be 'favorable' to the accused."' ' a
Therefore, the preliminary duty to preserve, ac-
cording to Bryant, is much broader than the duty
to disclose, for the prosecutor must preserve all
evidence which "might" be favorable. This stan-
dard is clearly much lower than even the lowest
Agurs standard of materiality which requires disclo-
sure of favorable evidence which might have af-
fected the jury.a
Furthermore, in regard to the sanctions to be
imposed, the court held that since the evidence was
lost, a new trial would be a pointless remedy for no
new evidence could be presented.3'  Therefore, the
court remanded either to dismiss the indictment or
affirm the conviction 23 Finally, the court held
that the preservation duty would be prospective
only and that the trial court should decide whether
or not to affirm this case by balancing "the degree
of negligence or bad faith involved, the importance
of the evidence lost, and the evidence of guilt
adduced at trial ' ' a 7
Although the Bryant court spoke of a prospective
prophylactic rule requiring investigative agencies
to establish preservation procedures or face sanc-
tions, the District of Columbia Circuit has failed
to follow its holding and continues to decide "lost"
evidence cases on a case-by-case basis using the
pragmatic balancing test set forth in Bryant.3ss Sim-
ilarly, other courts have accepted the Bryant bal-
7, 1977); United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir.
1976). See generally, Comment, Judicial Response to Govern-
mental Loss or Destruction of Evidence, 39 U. CIi. L. REv.
542 (1972).
3m Id. at 652 n.21. If a piece of evidence cannot meet
this extremely low test, it need not be preserved. See
United States v. Butler, 499 F.2d 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(test results of urine test conducted one day after offense
need not be preserved if test would not have created any
meaningful data as to the defendant's blood alcohol
content at the time of the offense.).
3"' 427 U.S. at 103.
as5 439 F.2d at 653. See also Gov't of the Virgin Islands
v. Testamark, No. 77-1567 (3d Cir. Dec. 7, 1977).356 Id.
=' Id.
3 8See United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (failure to preserve FBI notes not error);
United States v. Maynard, 476 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (remanded to determine if United States Attorney's
failure to preserve police notes prejudiced the defendant);
United States v. Bundy, 472 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
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ancing test and have applied it in determining
whether the failure to preserve resulted in error."
a 9
Generally, the most important factor in this
determination is the culpability of the prosecutor.
If the prosecutor loses or destroys the evidence
inadvertantly and in good faith, sanctions will
rarely be imposed, especially where evidence of
guilt is strong.360 Where the destruction is deliber-
ate and in bad faith, however, strict sanctions will
be imposed.3 6'
One factor which is generally absent from the
Bryant balancing test is a consideration of the fa-
vorability of the lost evidence. Most courts do not
require the defendant to show that the lost evidence
would have been favorable. Instead, mere allega-
tions of favorability seem to be sufficient where the
lost evidence is important. In People v. Harmes,
3 62
the court stated that "[wihere ... crucial material
evidence is wholly destroyed by the prosecution,
and the responsibility for such destruction cannot
properly be imputed to the defense, any require-
ment that the defendant somehow demonstrate
that the evidence was exculpatory becomes an
absurdity and is not imposed."'  Other courts and
commentators have adopted this reasoning.3
64
Although the Bryant balancing rule has been
generally applied in cases where the prosecutor
loses notes or files or statements of witnesses, differ-
(failure to preserve police notes not error). See also United
States v. Miranda, 526 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1975) (failure
to preserve tape recording of conversation between de-
fendant and informant not error).
m Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Testamark, No. 77-
1567 (3d Cir. Dec. 7, 1977); Armstrong v. Collier, 536
F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Miranda, 526
F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Pollock, 417
F. Supp. 1332 (D. Mass. 1976); United States v. Ivanov,
342 F. Supp. 928 (D.N.J. 1972). See also United States v.
Heiden, 508 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Henry, 487 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1973).
3w Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Testamark, No. 77-
1567 (3d Cir. Dec. 7, 1977); Armstrong v. Collier, 536
F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Miranda, 526
F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Bundy, 472
F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Ivanov, 342
F. Supp. 928 (D.N.J. 1972).
361 United States v. Pollock, 417 F. Supp. 1332 (D.
Mass. 1976) (where agent's notes had been intentionally
destroyed after being subpoenaed by the defendant, de-
struction was tantamount to bad faith and the indictment
was dismissed).
362 560 P.2d 470 (Colo. App. 1976).
-" Id. at 474.
-1' See United States v. Maynard, 476 F.2d 1170 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Comment,Judicial Response to Governmental Loss
or Destruction of Evidence, 39 U. CI. L. REv. 542 (1972).
But see State v. Meyers, 29 Or. App. 217, 562 P.2d 1227
(1977).
ent rules and considerable controversy have devel-
oped in the area of Governmental losses of physical,
scientific evidence. This problem has arisen chiefly
in cases involving drunk drivers and usually con-
cerns whether the test ampules used in the breath-
alyzer machine must be preserved.
The first case to deal with this issue was People v.
Hitch."s65 In Hitch, the defendant was arrested for
drunk driving and was given a breathalyzer test to
determine the amount of alcohol in his system.
After the test, the police officer intentionally, but
non-maliciously, destroyed the test ampule and its
contents which were used in the breathalyzer. The
defendant moved to suppress the test results, claim-
ing that the destruction of the ampule deprived
him of due process.366 The California Supreme
Court agreed and held that the test ampules "con-
stitute material evidence on the issue of guilt or
innocence," 367 and that if "there is a reasonable
possibility that they would constitute favorable
evidence... then such evidence must be dis-
closed." 3 6 Therefore, based on the lower court's
finding that preservation of the ampules was fea-
sible and that retests would lead to accurate re-
suits, 369 the court held that in the future the am-
pules must be preserved or test results would be
suppressed.3 70 The court said:
ISlanctions shall in the future be imposed for such
nonpreservation and nondisclosure unless the pros-
ecution can show that the governmental agencies
involved have established, enforced and attempted
in good faith to adhere to rigorous and systematic
procedures designed to preserve the test ampoule
and its contents and the reference ampoule used in
such chemical test.3"
If the prosecutor fails to establish such procedures,
the court held that "due process shall not require
a dismissal of the action but shall require merely
that the results of the breathalyzer test be excluded
from evidence."
3 72
36 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9
(1974).
36Id. at 645, 527 P.2d at 364, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
3
6
7 Id. at 652, 527 P.2d at 369, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
m Id. at 649, 527 P.2d at 367, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
39 Id. at 645, 527 P.2d at 364, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
However, the lower court recognized that a retest would
not be one hundred percent accurate. Id. at n.1.
370 Id. at 652-53, 527 P.2d at 369, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
371id.
3
72Id. at 653, 527 P.2d at 370, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
This sanction is less severe than those recommended by
the Bryant court. However, the Hitch court did warn that
bad faith destruction of an ampule could result in a
dismissal of the indictment. Id. at n.7.
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The Hitch decision has been criticized otn both
sctentifie and legal grotntds.:l:t Some courts have
rejected the scientific basis of Hitch that preserva-
tion is feasible and retests are accurate as totally
incorrect. For examl)le, in Lauderdale v. State,: 74 the
Alaska Siupreme Cottrt noted that "at the present
time, it is not possible to rerun a test and obtain
accurate results." ' 7T"l Consequently, if retests will
not lead to evidence of any probative value, there
is no need to preserve the anpule.
:17
More importantly, other courts have challenged
the legal interpretat ions and reasoning of the Hitch
decision. The Hitch court established a strict pro-
phylactic rule that the prosecutor nmust maintain
proceclttre to preserve the arpttles or else test
retsults wottld be supprcessed. This ruling was based
on an interpretation of Brady that the antpuls
ntst be disclosed if there was a "reasonable possi-
bility- that the ampules would produce favorable
evidence. InI State I, Michenert
77 
atd State v. Reaves, :78
pre-1gurs cases, the Oregon cottrts rejected tle
ttqtalified "reasonable possibility" langtmage of
Hitch its too broad and held that the Brady rule
requtires disclosure only when tite "defendant es-
tablishes a reasonable possibility, based an roncrete
evidence ratlhe than a fertile hnagination, that it would
be favorable to his cause. " 'r t1 This added require-
tnent is not terely verbiage, for under this rule
tenre allegat ions that the evidence would have been
fiavorahle is insufficient. IIn Michener, where the
defeindant produced videotapes of himself which
indicated that lie was sober at the tite of the
arrest, the court held that that was a sufficient
slowing to create doubts about tite breath test so
that suppression was correct where the atpule was
destroved.*"' It Reaves, ott the other hand, the court
indicated that sworn testimony that the defendant
was sober tnay not be sttfficient to create a reason-
able possibility of inaccuracy.: t
37,1 For a general discnmssion of the inpact of and the
reaction to htch, see Newman. The Right tu Independent
estng: A New, flitch tit the Presenattion of Evidence Doctrine.
75 Coit.t'. L. Ri.:v. 1:155 (1975).
;'-'4 5.111 1.2d :376 (Alaska 1976).
3, Id. at :379 1It). Other courts have reaceld the sane
conclusion. Se. State v. Shutt, 116 N.Hi. 495. :36:3 A.2d
.1106 (1976): State v. Teare. 135 N.J. Super. 19, 342 A.2d
556 (1975).
' State v. Teare. 1:15 N:J. Super. 19. :342 A.2d 556
(1975).
:"' 25 Or. App. 52:1, 550 P.2d 449 (1976).
378 25 Or. App. 745, 550 P.2d 1403 (1976).
. 25 Or. App. at 532, 550 P.2d at 454 (emphasis
added).
:m" Id.
''25 Or. Apm. at 7416. 55() P.2d at 1404.
Similarly, in Edwards v. Oklahona:L a post-Agurs
decision, the court rejected the Hitch opinion's
interpretation of Brady as too expansive. The court
stated:
I'l'Ihe Hitch court found that it sufficed that there
was a "rea.sonable possibility" that they I the an-
pul.sl inight constitute favorable evidence. This
extension of the Bra' )octrine is not justified as a
natter ofconstitutional law. Brad) focused upon the
harn to the defendant resulting from non-disclo-
sure. Hitch diverts this concern from the reality of
prejudice to speculating about contingent i)enefits
to tile defcndant.: "
Consequently, the Court held that the failure to
preserve the evidence would not result in a denial
of due process unless the-defendant could show a
high degree of prejudice as required by the Agurs
Court.;*' Since the favorability of a retest would
be speculative and there was other substantial
evidence of gttilt, the court held that the failure to
preserve the anptule was not constitutional error.:
As is evident front this review of cascs, the duty
to preserve has been defined in different ways.
Although the Agurs opinion did not addres.s this
issue directly, it should have some bearing on
decisions involving "lost" evidence. As established
by a number of courts, the defendant need not
conclusively prove that the lost evidence will be
favorable to. him. ' 86 This the Agurs decision will
probably not change, for if it did the duty to
disclose would be a mere sham easily avoided by
destruction of favorable evidence. It would be un-
fair to require the defendant to prove favorability
of a piece of evidence he may never have had a
chance to examine. Nevertheless, the defendant
must at least show the lost evidence "might" be
favorable and relevant.
However, the clear implication from Agurs is that
the prosecution should not be penalized just be-
cause ats inconsequential or inunaterial piece of
evidence is lost. Before a court engages in a Bryant-
type balancing test, it should first engage in the
Edward-type analysis. In other words, the court
should first assume the evidence if available would
be favorable to the defendant. Then it should
consider whether if the evidence were presented,
would it be of sufficient importance to meet the
materiality requirements of Agurs. If it would not,
v2 429 F. Supp. 668 (W.I). Okla. 1976).
l&Id. at 67 1.
" Id.
.K' Id.
'" Srr notes :162-64 .mpra and accomnpanying text.
COMMENTS
the inquiry is ended, for the nonpreservation could
not violate Brady in that even if it were preserved
it would- not have had to be disclosed. If it would
meet the Agurs standards then the court should
engage in the Bryant-type balancing process, weigh-
ing the culpability of the prosecutor, the impor-
tance of the evidence lost and the strength of the
evidence adduced at trial. This dual procedure
must be used to avoid use by the court of the Bryant
test in such a way that it will be divorcing the duty
to preserve from the duty to disclose. Such a result
would be illogical and incorrect because the pres-
ervation duty is predicated on the disclosure duty.
Thus, Agurs mandates this dual procedure by its
focus on substantive as.olposed to procedural is-
sues.
One final issue related to and which is an exten-
sion of the duty of preservation is whether the
prosecutor has a duty to seek out or aid the defense
in procuring favorable evidence. As a general rule,
the prosecutor has no duty to seek out favorable
.evidence for the defense.s 7 He need only disclose
favorable, material evidence which he has in his
possession. However, at least one court under an
expansive reading of-Brady has imposed such a duty
on the prosecutor. In Evans v. Superior Court of Contra
Costa County,& the defendant, arrested for bank
robbery, moved for a pretrial lineup because the
initial identification by the victim was allegedly
faulty.m Relying on Brady the court held that the
Government has a constitutional duty to provide
the defendant with a lineup in cases where "eye-
witness identification is shown to be in material
issue and there exists a reasonable likelihood of a
mistaken identification which a lineup would tend
to resolve." 3 0 The court analyzed the situation as
follows: the defendant "seeks to compel the People
to exercise a duty to discover material evidence
38 United States v. Walker, 559 F.2d 365, 373 (5th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Beaver, 524 F.2d 963, 966
(5th Cir. 1975); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Note, Pretrial Identification Procedures: The
Expanded Duty to Disclose Favorable Evidence, 50 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 508, 512 (1975).
IL Cal. 3d 617, 522 P.2d 681, 114 Cal. Rptr. 121
(1974).
M 11 Cal. 3d at 621, 522 P.2d at 683, 114 Cal. Rptr.
at 123. The defendant claimed that at the initial identi-
fication the witness only saw a limited view of the de-
fendant's head and shoulders from the rear, that the
witness would be reluctant to change his identification,
and that he would continue to identify the defendant
because he is the accused and would be dressed in jail
clothes. Id.
m Id. at 625, 522 P.2d at 686, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
which does not now, in effect, exist. Should peti-
tioner be denied his right of discovery the net effect
would be the same as if existing evidence were
intentionally suppressed.
' '391
No court before or after Evans has sought to
expand Brady this far.P The Evans court itself
recognized that it had no prior support for its
holding.393 This decision, possibly appealing from
a policy standpoint, is actually an unwarranted
extension of the Brady doctrine. Although the Evans
court did not distinguish between a duty to disclose
evidence already in the prosecutor's possession and
a duty to seek out favorable evidence on behalf of
the defendant, there is obviously a vast difference
between the two in the degree of burden placed on
the prosecutor and the kind of action required. The
Brady doctrine as it has developed has sought only
to require the prosecutor to fairly inform the de-
fendant of any materially favorable evidence in his
possession. Clearly,. neither Brady nor any other
Supreme Court decision ever envisioned the expan-
sion by the Evans court. The prosecutor's due proc-
ess duty to disclose should not encompass a duty to
seek out favorable evidence for the defense.
CONCLUSION
Even after United States v. Agurs the prosecutor's
duty to disclose remains a complex concept that
lacks definitional uniformity. The Agurs Court
sought to eliminate all of the unresolved issues left
by Brady v. Maryland and to establish the different
standards to be used in assessing the materiality of
allegedly favorable evidence. However, although
the Court erected these standards, it failed to pro-
vide an analytical framework for use in every case.
Nevertheless, in view of the foregoing discussion
a complete framework with which to analyze the
disclosure decision can be developed. Essentially,
this framework consists of a two-tiered analysis.
First, it must be determined into which of the three
categories identified by Agurs the evidence fits.
These are: (1) knowing use of perjury cases, (2)
specific request cases, and (3) general or no request
cases. Once the category is determined, the stan-
dard of materiality is then known, for the Agurs
Coutt established a standard for each type of evi-
9 Id.
m But cf. Adams v. Stone, 378 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Cal.
1974) (it may be a denial of due process for police to
refuse to give a breathalyzer -test to defendant upon
request where it is a standard test normally given).
U 11 Cal. 3d at 621, 522 P.2d at 684, 114 Cal. Rptr.
at 124.
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dence. For the first two categories, the standard to
be applied is quite low. Essentially, the standard
is, "Might the evidence affect the trier of fact's
decision?" In the last situation, however, the stan-
dard is quite high. Essentially this standard is,
"Does the evidence create a reasonable doubt as to
guilt?"
Once the standard of materiality is known, a
second, more complex analysis must be under-
taken. This analysis consists of evaluating the evi-
dence in the. light of several factors of materiality
to determine whether the evidence is sufficiently
material to require disclosure. The factors of ma-
teriality which must be considered are: (1) favora-
bility, (2) admissibility, (3) extent of probative
value: exculpatory v. impeachment, (4) weight of
the evidence and (5) deference to the trial judge.
All these factors should be present in every case at
some point in the proceedings. In order to achieve
the most accurate decision all the factors must be
considered.
Use of this construct by the courts will provide
greater uniformity in their decisions and give the
prosecutor a better idea of what evidence he must
disclose. Presently, with each court analyzing the
duty to disclose in a somewhat different manner,
the prosecutor is caught in a guessing game as to
the scope of his duty. In this way, therefore, much
of the present uncertainty as to what evidence must
be disclosed can be eliminated.
On the other hand, because the Supreme Court
failed to address the other collateral issues sur-
rounding the prosecutor's duty to disclose, such as
timing and preservation, these areas are still
shrouded in uncertainty as the lower courts have
assumed contrary positions. However, although the
Agurs Court did not specifically resolve these issues,
the principle of the Agurs opinion should be applied
in resolving them and should lead to more uniform
results.
Agurs clearly established that the due process
requirement that the prosecutor disclose material
favorable evidence was not a procedural right of
discovery on behalf of the defendant but rather
only a fair trial guarantee. Therefore, any failure
by the prosecutor to fulfill his disclosure duty
should only be regarded as error if the failure in
some material way deprived the defendant of a fair
trial. In essence Agurs signifies a retreat from the
prior broad expansion of the disclosure require-
ment based on a rebalancing of the individual
defendant's procedural rights and society's interest
in the conviction of the guilty. If future issues are
resolved with this principle in mind, greater uni-
formity and equity can be achieved.
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